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Abstract
Film is ubiquitous, but the processes that guide viewers’ attention while viewing film narratives are poorly understood.
In fact, many film theorists and practitioners disagree on whether the film stimulus (bottom-up) or the viewer
(top-down) is more important in determining how we watch movies. Reading research has shown a strong
connection between eye movements and comprehension, and scene perception studies have shown strong
effects of viewing tasks on eye movements, but such idiosyncratic top-down control of gaze in film would be
anathema to the universal control mainstream filmmakers typically aim for. Thus, in two experiments we tested
whether the eye movements and comprehension relationship similarly held in a classic film example, the famous
opening scene of Orson Welles’ Touch of Evil (Welles & Zugsmith, Touch of Evil, 1958). Comprehension differences
were compared with more volitionally controlled task-based effects on eye movements. To investigate the effects
of comprehension on eye movements during film viewing, we manipulated viewers’ comprehension by starting
participants at different points in a film, and then tracked their eyes. Overall, the manipulation created large
differences in comprehension, but only produced modest differences in eye movements. To amplify top-down
effects on eye movements, a task manipulation was designed to prioritize peripheral scene features: a map task.
This task manipulation created large differences in eye movements when compared to participants freely viewing
the clip for comprehension. Thus, to allow for strong, volitional top-down control of eye movements in film, task
manipulations need to make features that are important to narrative comprehension irrelevant to the viewing
task. The evidence provided by this experimental case study suggests that filmmakers’ belief in their ability to
create systematic gaze behavior across viewers is confirmed, but that this does not indicate universally similar
comprehension of the film narrative.
Keywords: Eye tracking, Eye movements, Film perception, Film comprehension, Scene perception, Narrative
comprehension, Visual attention, Inferences
Significance
Film, television, and video are ubiquitous, and viewers of
these media generally have similar narrative experiences
despite the complexity of the audiovisual stimuli and
large individual differences across viewers. One potential
reason for this is the filmmaking techniques for creating
highly systematic viewing experiences that filmmakers
have intuitively developed and believe to be highly ef-
fective. However, these intuitions have rarely been em-
pirically validated. Does film work the way filmmakers
think it does? Highly produced mainstream films have
been empirically shown to guide viewers to look at the
same places at the same time and the association be-
tween gaze location and bottom-up visual salience has
been reliably computationally modeled. But, the contri-
bution of online top-down cognitive factors, such as
comprehension and viewing task, that are known to have
large effects on eye movements during reading and static
scene viewing are poorly understood for films. This is of
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critical importance, because although where a person
looks and their understanding are highly correlated, if a
film viewer has little control over where they look this
relationship may be weaker. Our study shows that when
viewers watch mainstream movies their visual attention
is only modestly affected by differences in narrative
comprehension. However, conscious control of one’s at-
tention by a task at odds with comprehending the narra-
tive more strongly guides attention. These results further
our understanding of how filmmakers’ and viewers’ goals
both shape viewer experience.
Background
“…and all of us go into a kind of lock step where, if
we were watching a tennis match, you’d see that
perfect synchronicity of heads going left-right, left-
right. The same thing in a movie theatre, when the
movie is working and the audience is galvanised, al-
most hypnotised, all watching the same things, all
knowing where to look at the exact same time…it’s a
wonderful thing. There is nothing greater than that.”
(Spielberg, 2013).
“If a million people see my movie, I hope they see a
million different movies.” (Tarantino, 1995)
Watching movies and videos is a ubiquitous activity
around the world. Such highly produced videos are very
complex stimuli. Yet, they are produced by professional
filmmakers for broad entertainment audiences using
popular techniques believed to ease viewing and com-
prehension processes (Smith, 2012), and people seem to
comprehend them with little difficulty. Nevertheless, to
date little research has been done to explain why this
may be the case (Smith, Levin, & Cutting, 2012). One
stage of the film comprehension process that might be
critical to this apparently effortlessness is how the eyes
move across the screen. As demonstrated by the Steven
Spielberg quote above, filmmakers believe they have the
power to make their audience look exactly where they
want them to irrespective of who the audience is. This
belief in the primacy of the audiovisual stimulus for
guiding attention and, assumedly subsequent com-
prehension, reflects the tone of practical filmmaking
guides (Katz, 1991), accounts of the “rules” used in film
construction (Bordwell & Thompson, 2001), and film-
makers’ reflections on their craft (Murch, 2001; Reisz &
Millar, 1953). The strong assumption that viewers pas-
sively receive a film’s meaning, and that individual differ-
ences such as age, gender, race, and sexuality do not
impact this reception, was also shared by classic film
theories including the Structuralist, Auteurist, Formalist,
Marxist, and Psychoanalytic theories (see Stam and
Miller (1999) for review).
However, these theories and the view of mainstream
filmmakers like Spielberg are out of line with currently
dominant film theories. Since the 1960s, advances in
film theory have mirrored movements in other areas of
the arts to increase the prominence of the individual
viewer in theorizing about the act of meaning making
(i.e., comprehension). Theoretical movements including
Cultural Studies (and its specialist foci such as Feminist
and Queer Film Theory), Reception Studies, and Cogni-
tive Film Studies (Bordwell & Carroll, 1996) have ac-
knowledged that films do not have a single meaning but
can be read differently by different people, depending on
their desires, ideology, and social differences (Hall,
1980). According to these newer film theories, the film
experience is similar to a discourse in which, while the
viewer is usually passively seated, they are cognitively ac-
tive in selecting, encoding, and constructing their part of
the filmic discourse (Tseng & Bateman, 2013). This view
is sometimes also shared by filmmakers who push the
boundaries of film, such as Quentin Tarantino (see his
earlier quote made when discussing his multi-threaded
narrative film Pulp Fiction, 1994).
The mental activity of viewers is typically inaccessible to
film theorists (except through introspection; Brown,
2015), but a key piece of physical evidence that does exist
is how viewers move their eyes on the screen. Further-
more, we can assess their film understanding through
their verbal responses to questions. To what extent do
film viewers’ eye movements and measured film compre-
hension support either Spielberg’s belief that he has abso-
lute control over viewers’ gaze and comprehension of a
film, or contemporary film theories’ and Tarantino’s asser-
tion that each viewer sees and understands a different
film? Empirical disciplines, such as cognitive science, can
play a role in exploring the insights of filmmakers and in
helping to resolve this debate (Bortolussi & Dixon, 2003;
Sanford & Emmott, 2012). In doing so, we can develop
and refine theories of how we make sense of media and
the role of eye movements in that process.
Eye movements in scenes
While watching a film, viewers typically move their eyes
two to five times per second in order to extract informa-
tion from it, and those eye movements are likely related
to viewers’ understanding of the film they are watching
(Eisenstein, 1948; Jesionowski, 1982; Murch, 2001;
Smith, 2012). Causally, this relationship can go in two
directions: attention guiding comprehension, or what is
being comprehended guiding attention. There is a long
literature on “bottom-up” features that guide attention
in scenes (e.g., color, edges, and motion; Itti, 2005; Mital,
Smith, Hill, & Henderson, 2010). In film, these bottom-
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up features have been shown to have such a strong
effect on attention that they lead people to look at the
same places at the same times, which has been termed
“attentional synchrony” in film (Dorr, Martinetz,
Gegenfurtner, & Barth, 2010; Smith, 2013; Smith et al.,
2012). Similar synchrony in brain activity has been
shown using functional magnetic resonance imaginh
(fMRI; Hasson et al., 2008; Shepherd, Steckenfinger,
Hasson, & Ghazanfar, 2010) and electroencephalog-
raphy (EEG; Dmochowski, Sajda, Dias, & Parra, 2012).
Such bottom-up influences contrast with “top-down”
factors such as the viewer’s task, individual differences,
preferences, and the viewer’s active mental model of
the scene. The current study asks what role top-down
comprehension processes play during film viewing. Al-
though hardly any previous research has addressed this
question directly (but see Lahnakoski et al., 2014; Loschky,
Larson, Magliano, & Smith, 2015), two well-developed
lines of research are highly relevant: research on eye
movements and reading comprehension and research on
eye movements in static and dynamic scenes.
Top-down and bottom-up effects on eye movements
At a broad level, comprehension processes for narra-
tive content have been studied in the realm of text
(McNamara & Magliano, 2009 for review), and readers’
eye movements have been shown to differ based on their
comprehension (reviewed by Rayner, 1998). Importantly,
such comprehension effects on eye movements occur at
both the local and global levels (Rayner & Morris, 1990;
Rayner, Raney, & Pollatsek, 1995). Examples of this rela-
tionship at the local level are eye movements associated
with the processing of anaphoric references (e.g., identi-
fying the character that is referred to with the pronoun
“he”), which typically involve sentences that closely occur
in a text (Ehrlich & Rayner, 1983), and generating elabo-
rative inferences that are closely associated with the se-
mantic content of specific sentences (O’Brien, Shank,
Myers, & Rayner, 1988). Examples at the global level in-
clude the fact that, as the overall difficulty of a text in-
creases, readers tend to make more eye movements
(Rayner, Chace, Slattery, & Ashby, 2006), that information
presented ironically produces more regressive eye move-
ments (Kaakinen, Olkoniemi, Kinnari, & Hyönä, 2014),
and that reading times get faster as one progresses
through a text (in part due to repetitions of concepts;
Rayner et al., 1995). Findings such as these are the basis
of the “eye-mind hypothesis” (Just & Carpenter, 1980;
Reichle, Pollatsek, Fisher, & Rayner, 1998; Reilly &
Radach, 2006) that eye movements are driven by online
cognitive processes (e.g., fixation is maintained longer
for words that need more processing).
At one level, it is reasonable to assume that compre-
hension processes are similar for text and film (e.g.,
Magliano, Loschky, Clinton, & Larson, 2013), and as
such one would expect a connection between each
movie viewer’s comprehension and their eye movements.
More specifically, when movie viewers have different in-
formation incorporated into their event models for a nar-
rative (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998), it seems reasonable
that they would attend to different aspects of the film
stimulus in order to update their event model, as has been
shown for reading text (Anderson & Pichert, 1978).
Similar top-down effects on attention are found dur-
ing scene viewing. When viewing static scenes, eye
movements can be affected by volitional and mandatory
top-down processes (Baluch & Itti, 2011). Volitional
top-down processes are things like the goal or task of
the viewer (Henderson, 2007; reviewed in Henderson &
Hollingworth, 1998). Mandatory top-down processes
are learned biases that guide attention without any
intention to do so (Baluch & Itti, 2011). In the lab,
mandatory top-down effects are often implicitly trained
during complex search tasks (Baluch & Itti, 2010; Chun
& Jiang, 1998). Similar processes could also be argued
to occur naturally in scene searches in which context
and cognitive relevance have been shown to guide vis-
ual search (Eckstein, Drescher, & Shimozaki, 2006;
Henderson, Malcolm, & Schandl, 2009; Torralba, Oliva,
Castelhano, & Henderson, 2006), and generally in the
tendency to fixate faces in scenes (Birmingham, Bischof,
& Kingstone, 2008) and the speaker in a scene (Coutrot
& Guyader, 2014; Ho, Foulsham, & Kingstone, 2015;
Vo, Smith, Mital, & Henderson, 2012). The same is true
when watching video clips, in which the where and
when of viewer attention on a screen is influenced by
both volitional processes such as the goals of the viewer
(Henderson et al., 2009) and more mandatory processes
such as who is speaking (Coutrot & Guyader, 2014; Ho
et al., 2015; Vo et al., 2012). Alternatively, bottom-up
features of scenes are also known to have strong effects
on visual attention (Itti, 2005; Mital et al., 2010), but
may not affect the interpretation of the scene (Latif,
Gehmacher, Castelhano, & Munhall, 2014). When
watching films, the role of bottom-up features appears
to be very strong, such that when viewing highly pro-
duced Hollywood film trailers, people tend to look at
the same places at the same times, known as “atten-
tional synchrony” (Dorr et al., 2010; Hasson et al., 2008;
Itti, 2005; Mital et al., 2010). This is very different from
static scenes and “natural videos” (i.e., those lacking a nar-
rative or any filmmaking techniques) in which viewers
show lower attentional synchrony (i.e., they may look at
similar points of interest, but not at the same time) (Dorr
et al., 2010; Mannan, Ruddock, & Wooding, 1997).
However, there may be differences in how information
is extracted across media (Magliano et al., 2013;
Magliano, Higgs, & Clinton, in press). For example,
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Loughlin, Grossnickle, Dinsmore, and Alexander (2015)
showed that visual search is prominent in processing art,
but that these processes are not central to making sense
of text-based narratives. It may be that narrative film has
properties that affect eye movements during comprehen-
sion in such a way that the nature of the eye–mind con-
nection is different than how it is manifested in text
comprehension.
Film narrative is unique
Differences between the linguistic and visual modalities
of narrative representation need to be accounted for
when researching comprehension in visual narratives
(Magliano et al., 2013). For example, written text is com-
posed of distinct words arranged in lines and paragraphs
on a page, and readers typically fixate every content
word (noun, verb, adjective, and adverb) in a line, pro-
gressing from left to right (in English). In contrast, films
are composed of moving images within a frame, but
there are no stated rules for how film viewers should
watch them, though filmmakers follow numerous con-
ventions in creating them (Smith, 2012). Also, film shots
are typically viewed serially from beginning to end, un-
less a solitary film viewer uses a remote control with
pause and rewind functions. This is in contrast with
reading in which the reader controls their pace of read-
ing and can vary the amount of time they allocate to
processing a piece of information (i.e., fixation/dwell
duration) and make regressive eye movements back to
previously read words.
Similarly, the highly produced nature of film contains
several features that exert strong bottom-up control
and increase attentional synchrony (Dorr et al., 2010;
Smith, 2013). Importantly, these features are used based
on the practical film theory that they guide viewer atten-
tion (Eisenstein, 1948; Murch, 2001; Spielberg, 2013). The
bottom-up features include motion (Mital et al., 2010),
editing (Wang, Freeman, Merriam, Hasson, & Heeger,
2012), and lighting (Cutting, Brunick, DeLong, Iricinschi,
& Candan, 2011; Murch, 2001). Additionally, filmmakers
often compose highly produced dynamic scenes to include
few points of interest, or construct them such that the
bottom-up features guide attention to a single point of
interest (Cutting, 2015). Compared to highly produced
film, the visual features of both static text and static scenes
have relatively weak bottom-up features. Potentially due
to the weak bottom-up visual features, many studies have
shown strong top-down effects on eye movements in text
reading (Hyönä & Lorch, 2004; Rayner et al., 1995; Wiley
& Rayner, 2000) and static scene viewing (DeAngelus &
Pelz, 2009; Yarbus, 1967). All the above differences be-
tween films, reading, and other types of scene viewing
suggest that a simple analogy between how viewers
process each is likely to be wrong.
Comprehension and eye movements in film
The few studies that have tested top-down effects on
eye movements in film have what may appear to be
contradictory effects. Lahnakoski et al. (2014) found
that giving viewers an explicit task to take a certain
perspective (interior decorator or detective) can have a
top-down effect on eye movements. Alternatively, to
test the same research question as the current study,
how comprehension processes affect eye movements,
Loschky, Larson, Magliano, and Smith (2015) pre-
sented participants with a scene from the James Bond
film Moonraker (Broccoli & Gilbert, 1979) and had
them start viewing the clip earlier (Context condition)
or later (No-context condition). They found that par-
ticipants had large differences in comprehension due
to their context condition, but there were relatively
weak effects of comprehension on eye movements. The
lack of a top-down effect on eye movements despite
large comprehension differences was termed the “Tyr-
anny of Film”. Put differently, the Tyranny of Film is
the presence of gaze similarity between groups regard-
less of comprehension differences between viewers,
where gaze similarity refers to groups having the same
amount of gaze clustering on the same location(s) in
the scene (specific details of the gaze similarity analysis
are below).
The few eye-movement differences in Loschky et al.
(2015) occurred during a single shot of the clip that was
essentially a static image that allowed participant gaze to
explore the image. In other words, the static nature of
the scene may have allowed for eye-movement differ-
ences similar to those found in previous experiments
using static scenes (DeAngelus & Pelz, 2009; Smith &
Mital, 2013; Yarbus, 1967). Nonetheless, the lack of eye-
movement differences throughout the rest of the film
clip were striking given the large effects typically found
during static scene viewing, and the effects found for
perspective taking (Lahnakoski et al., 2014) and
location-based viewing tasks (Smith & Mital, 2013).
Taya, Windridge, and Osman (2012) give evidence for
when there is a lack of top-down effects during free-
viewing. Similarly, Wang et al. (2012) used a scrambling
manipulation with narrative film sequences, which is
known to reduce narrative comprehension and memory
for texts and picture stories (Gernsbacher, Varner, &
Faust, 1990; Larson, Wallace, McQuade, Badke, &
Loschky, 2011; Thorndyke, 1977), yet Wang et al. (2012)
found very few effects on eye movements except looking
at the “most important object” immediately after each
cut. This raises the critically important question ad-
dressed in the current study, namely, why and when is
there a general dissociation between eye movements and
film comprehension, which fails to support the eye–mind
hypothesis in film viewing?
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Overview of the present study
Filmmakers and theorists have long debated the degree
to which viewers are active in their consumption of film
(see Stam & Miller, 1999 for review). Previous empirical
work has found that, in highly composed and rapidly
edited films, there seem to be minimal opportunities for
top-down impact on narrative processing and gaze
(Carmi & Itti, 2006; Hasson et al., 2008; Loschky et al.,
2015; Mital et al., 2010; Smith & Mital, 2013). Consistent
with these previous works, the present study strategically
used a “found film” clip that best illustrated the
phenomenon of interest and built an experimental para-
digm around it. In this case, based on the prior research
described above, we wanted a found film that did not
conform to the features of a typical, highly produced
narrative film (Bordwell, 2002) so that we could create a
strong test of top-down comprehension effects on eye
movements in film.
We developed selection criteria for a clip based both
on its bottom-up features and what it afforded in terms
of top-down manipulations. First, the clip needed to lack
specific bottom-up features that create attentional syn-
chrony, which should therefore enhance the opportunity
for top-down processes to differentially guide viewers’
eye movements while watching the clip. Many film se-
quences show only a single primary object of interest in
each shot, which limits the opportunities for attention to
be shifted to different screen locations. A film segment
with many different things to look at could reduce the
degree of attentional synchrony as different people may
look at different things in the film frame. Second, each
time there is a film cut (i.e., a switch between camera
shots) there is a sudden decrease and then increase in
attentional synchrony as viewers search for and then
find the point of central interest in the new shot (Carmi
& Itti, 2006). A film sequence lacking any cuts for long
periods of time (i.e., a “long-take”) would remove the
“resetting” after each cut (Mital et al., 2010; Wang et al.,
2012). We chose one of the most famous long-takes in
film history, the opening scene of Orson Welles’ Touch
of Evil (Welles & Zugsmith, 1958). This long (3 minutes
and 12 seconds) single shot depicts events at a Mexico–
USA border crossing in the 1950s. Using a combination
of deep-focus, wide framing, and a continuous camera
movement that takes in much background action, this
shot is a much-discussed example of the type of filmic
composition film theorist Andre Bazin viewed as the
“ideal” way for cinema to capture reality (Bazin, 1967).
Bazin stated that by not cutting but instead choosing to
depict the action in a single long-take, directors like
Orson Welles (here and in Citizen Kane, 1941) evoke:
a more active mental attitude on the part of the
spectator and a more positive contribution on his part
to the action in progress. While analytical montage
[i.e., including many cuts and shots] only calls for him
to follow his guide, to let his attention follow along
smoothly with that of the director who will choose
what he should see, here he is called upon to exercise
at least a minimum personal choice. It is from his
attention and his will that the meaning of the image
in part derives. (Bazin, 1967, p. 35–36)
This Bazin quote (from the perspective of film the-
ory) directly supports our prediction that the opening
shot of Touch of Evil should provide an ideal opportun-
ity to find top-down influences of viewer’s comprehen-
sion on their gaze.
To create top-down comprehension effects on gaze, it
may also be necessary to require the viewer to acquire
information from different regions within the scene. For
example, Taya et al. (2012) found that both experts and
novices tend to have high gaze similarity while watching
a tennis match. One likely reason for this is that regard-
less of expertise, there was only one primary thing to
watch—namely the ball (and, to a lesser extent, the
player whose court the ball was in). Similarly, in the
Moonraker clip used in Loschky et al. (2015), there was
usually only a single primary object of interest in each
shot, thus theoretically increasing the degree of atten-
tional synchrony. For the current study, choosing the
Touch of Evil clip that has multiple objects in the frame
that could be relevant to the narrative at any given mo-
ment allows for a top-down manipulation that would re-
quire viewers to look in different places (Bazin, 1967).
The narrative content of the opening shot of Touch of
Evil (https://youtu.be/vIUBoj8CqF8) allows for just such
a manipulation of comprehension at the event model
level (Kintsch, 1998; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). The clip
opens on a close-up of someone setting a time bomb
(Fig. 1). The time bomb is then placed into the trunk of
a car, after which a couple unknowingly gets into the car
and drives off, as the camera follows them. About half-
way through the clip a second couple walking down the
street is introduced (played by Charlton Heston and
Janet Leigh, who are mentioned in the quote below), and
the camera begins to follow them with the car always
lurking around them. Importantly, after the bomb is put
into the car, the bomb is never seen again for the re-
mainder of the clip. Many film critics have argued that
this creates a very suspenseful experience for viewers as
they wait for the time bomb to explode (Comito, 1986;
D’Angelo, 2012; Stubbs, 1985), and has been theorized
to specifically guide attention to the car:
Our knowledge of the impending explosion makes us
hyper-aware of the car’s location, especially in relation
to Heston and Leigh (even though we don’t yet know
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anything about their characters), and Welles expertly
teases this instinctive anxiety by allowing it to occa-
sionally leave the frame, getting a few feet ahead of
our heroes before being stopped by traffic or passing
goats. (D’Angelo, 2012)
The camera does not … move about in order to
concentrate and guide our attention. Rather, it seems
teasingly to withhold from us what we want to see,
what we know–from what we’ve been permitted to
see and also from other movies we’ve seen–must be
coming. (Comito, 1986, p. 8)
Thus, from a filmmaker’s perspective, it is the know-
ledge of the bomb that makes the clip so suspenseful—-
without the bomb, it is just a mundane shot of people
and cars on a street. There is theoretical support for
these filmmaker intuitions. The presence of the bomb
should create a token (i.e., “[bomb]”) in the viewer’s event
model that is associated with the car (e.g., Radvansky,
2005), which should be reactivated every time the car is in
the frame, including its causal implications for subsequent
narrative events (i.e., it creates imminent danger for any-
one near it) (e.g., Myers & O’Brien, 1998). Conversely, if a
viewer did not see the bomb put in the car, the car would
have no particularly salient causal connections in the
unfolding narrative, other than as a means of transporta-
tion for characters that may or may not be of relevance to
the narrative, and would simply be a part of the back-
grounded events weakly represented in the event model.
Thus, theories of comprehension would say viewers
should pay greater attention to the car when the bomb is
part of their event model than when it is not. Our com-
prehension manipulation plays on the power of the bomb
to create suspense, and make the car with the bomb an in-
tegral component of the scene. Overall, knowledge of the
bomb and an impending explosion is at a fairly global level
of comprehension, but which gives different levels of im-
portance to local features of the scene (e.g., the car).
To manipulate knowledge of the bomb, we used the
“jumped-in-the-middle” paradigm developed by Loschky
et al. (2015). This manipulation creates the common ex-
perience of coming into a television program or film
part way through and then trying to comprehend what
is happening. Context group participants saw the bomb
being placed in the car at the beginning of the scene, while
the No-context group do not see that. At the end of the
clip, all participants were asked to predict what would
happen next, which provided a basis for demonstrating
that the manipulation of context affected comprehension.
Eye movements were the primary data of interest.
We assessed both gaze similarity (i.e., the similarity in
participant fixation locations on a frame by frame basis)
and the extent to which participants fixated on the car
with the bomb in the two context conditions. Specific-
ally, the “Event Model” hypothesis (Loschky et al., 2015)
predicts there will be greater gaze similarity within con-
ditions (Context and No-context) than between them.
This could be the result of, for example, a greater likeli-
hood of viewers fixating on the car in the Context con-
dition than in the No-context condition, as predicted by
D’Angelo (2012) above and other film theorists (Comito,
Fig. 1 Frames illustrating important shots in the 3 minute 12 second clip from the film Touch of Evil (Welles & Zugsmith, 1958). The blue box
shows the Context condition (experiments 1 and 2), the orange box shows the No-context condition (experiment 1), and the green box shows the
No-context condition (experiment 2)
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1986; Stubbs, 1985). Overall, Context condition partici-
pants looking at the car more would likely result in less
exploratory behavior, which would be seen in longer fix-
ation durations and shorter saccades. Alternatively, ac-
cording to the Tyranny of Film hypothesis (Loschky et
al., 2015), the attentional synchrony created by the
bottom-up features of this masterfully produced film
(created by virtuoso filmmaker Orson Welles) would
limit the impact of top-down comprehension on eye
movements. Specifically, if everyone is looking at the
same places at the same times, there would be no room
for differences in eye movements due to differences in
viewers’ comprehension. As such, this hypothesis pre-
dicts comparable levels of gaze similarity and number of
fixations on the car with the bomb in the two context
conditions. Importantly, in comparison to the James
Bond Moonraker clip used in Loschky et al. (2015), the
comparatively weaker bottom-up features of the Touch
of Evil clip should theoretically reduce the attentional
synchrony. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that Welles
used all the other filmmaking techniques at his disposal
(mis-en-scene [i.e., staging], camera framing [i.e., what is
shown on camera], camera movement, etc.) to master-
fully guide viewers’ attention.
This found film approach is valuable in situations
where it is difficult to equate stimuli on the features of
interest, which is the case when using naturalistic films
that vary dramatically in visual cinematic features that
can affect attention and eye movements. Additionally, it is
intended to demonstrate a phenomenon that already exists
in the world that should subsequently be studied in a more
controlled manner, likely with multiple experimenter-
generated video clips. Importantly, the present study was
carried out as a replication and extension to Loschky et al.
(2015), thus adding greater generalizability to it, and pro-
viding new and deeper insights.
Experiment 1: context and eye movements
Methods
Experiment 1 tested the effect of the comprehension dif-
ferences on viewers’ eye movements while watching the
film clip.
Participants
Eighty-four participants (61 females; mean age = 18.6 years;
standard deviation (SD) = 1.4) were pseudo-randomly
assigned to one of two viewing conditions for the opening
scene of Touch of Evil (Context, n = 42; No-context, n =
42). The Kansas State University Institutional Review
Board approved all experiments in the study. The study
was determined to pose minimal risk to the participants
and informed consent was deemed unnecessary (i.e., ex-
empt under the criteria set forth in the Federal Policy for
the Protection of Human Subjects.) All participants
received course credit for their participation, and all ana-
lyses were performed on de-identified data.
Stimuli
Two clips from the opening scene of Orson Welles
Touch of Evil were used (Welles & Zugsmith, 1958). The
Context version shows a bomb being placed in a car
trunk at the beginning and runs for 3:12. The No-
context version omits the first 18 seconds when the
bomb is placed in the car and runs for 2:54. Both clips
end with a close-up of the walking couple kissing. An
initial experiment (Hutson, Magliano, Smith, &
Loschky, Working memory span and film comprehen-
sion: Effects on high-level inference generation, in prep-
aration, not presented here, found that presenting the
clip with audio created the largest effect between the
Context and No-context conditions in inference gener-
ation. Thus, audio was presented with the film clip.
Both clips were presented at a frame rate of 30 frames
per second (fps) and a resolution of 1080 × 720 pixels.
The video clips were shown on a 17” ViewSonic Graph-
ics Series CRT monitor (Model G90fb). A chin and fore-
head rest set a fixed viewing distance of 60.96 cm. The
screen subtended 21.42° × 16.10° of visual angle.
Eye tracking was done using an EyeLink1000 eye
tracker (SR Research), which samples eye position 1000
times per second (1000 Hz). Based on the SR Research
guidelines, an average spatial accuracy of 0.5° of visual
angle and a maximum error of 1° or better were ob-
tained for all calibrations.1
Procedure
All participants were told that they would be shown a
video clip while their eyes were tracked. Participants
went through a nine-point calibration routine, after
which the experiment began. An eye-movement trigger
was used to ensure that the video started at the begin-
ning of a fixation. To start a trial, while the participant
was looking at the central fixation point, they pressed a
button which moved the fixation point 13.65° to right of
center. Once the participant fixated the new point, it
moved back to the center. During the saccade (velocity >
30°/s) back to the center, the video began to play. In this
way, any saccadic inhibition (which increases the current
fixation duration), caused by the motion transient due to
the sudden onset of the video clip, was masked by the
viewer’s own eye movement (Reingold & Stampe, 2000,
2002). Participants then watched the video, uninter-
rupted, until the moment when the couple kisses (3:12
into the Context condition and 2:54 into the No-context
condition). At the end of the video all participants were
asked, “What will happen next?” and responses were col-
lected using the computer keyboard. The next question
asked was, “Have you seen this movie before?” The
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keyboard was used to indicate “Yes” or “No.” If a partici-
pant responded “Yes” they were asked the follow-up
question, “What was the name of the movie?” No partic-
ipants indicated having seen the movie before.
Data analysis
To identify whether participants’ predictive inferences at
the end of the clip were influenced by having the bomb
in their event model, we had two research assistants
code each inference, with coders blind to the condition
from which each response was taken. The coding of the
inference was dichotomous from (1 = participant men-
tioned something related to the bomb, 0 = the partici-
pant did not). The coders had a high level of inter-rater
reliability (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.954, p < 0.001). Any
remaining discrepancies between the two coders were
resolved through discussion. After coding, the four par-
ticipant groups were Context + Inference (n = 33), Con-
text + No-inference (n = 9), No-context + Inference (n =
1), and No-context + No-inference (n = 41).
In this and all following experiments, Bayes factors
(BF01 reported) (Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province,
2012; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009;
Wetzels & Wagenmakers, 2012) were calculated for tests
that did not reject the null to identify the level of evi-
dence for the null, which would support the Tyranny of
Film hypothesis. Values over 1 offer some evidence for
the null, over 3 is substantial evidence, and over 10 is
strong evidence for the null.
An important consideration when analyzing eye-
movement data in videos is that there may be smooth
pursuit eye movements, which are low-velocity eye
movements during which visual information still reaches
the visual cortex. Unfortunately, there are still no reli-
able methods for parsing eye-movement data to differen-
tiate between fixations and smooth pursuits (Larsson,
Nyström, Ardö, Åström, & Stridh, 2016). Nevertheless,
this issue was addressed by rerunning analyses that
didn’t already account for smooth pursuit with a clean-
ing procedure to remove potential smooth pursuits. The
cleaning procedure quantified the maximum linear dis-
placements during intersaccadic intervals (the period
when the eye-tracker eye-movement parser estimated
that the eyes were in a fixation due to their velocity be-
ing lower than the saccade threshold). The change in eye
location during the intersaccadic interval was identified
first by calculating the Euclidean distance in pixels be-
tween the x,y location of where the saccade before the
intersaccadic interval ended and the location of where
the next saccade began. This pixel value was then con-
verted to the degrees of visual angle that the eyes moved
during each intersaccadic interval. The majority of these
intersaccadic intervals are likely to be fixations and ex-
hibit low displacement. However, potential smooth
pursuits, by definition, require displacement along with
a moving target and can therefore be excluded by re-
moving all intersaccadic intervals with displacements
greater than 1° of visual angle. Surprisingly, this resulted
in about 30% of all previously identified fixations being
cleaned from the data set, regardless of experiment or
condition. This is a noticeably higher proportion of po-
tential pursuits than has previously been reported for
video viewing (e.g., 2.8% of all data; Smith & Mital,
2013). However, despite the large number of previously
identified fixations being removed from the data, the
effects found for the remaining fixations (with low dis-
placement; unlikely to be pursuit periods) were un-
changed. Below, we report results both with and without
the intrasaccadic cleaning to remove potential smooth
pursuit eye movements from fixations.
Results
Overview
As will be described in detail below, the results of ex-
periment 1 showed that although there were large differ-
ences in participant comprehension based on the
context manipulation, the only eye-movement effect
showed Context participants who made the inference
had longer saccade lengths than No-context participants.
Bayes factors indicated that all other effects (fixation du-
rations, gaze similarity, and region of interest) supported
the null hypothesis. Thus, experiment 1 mostly sup-
ported the Tyranny of Film hypothesis.
Predictive inference
A chi-square test was used to identify whether there was
a comprehension difference between the Context and
No-context conditions. The expected difference between
context conditions was found, with 80% of participants
in the Context condition making a bomb-relevant infer-
ence compared to only one participant from the No-
context condition doing so (X2 (1, N = 85) = 51.59, p <
0.001). There were also qualitative differences in the pre-
dictive inferences generated. Specifically, instead of pre-
dicting that the bomb would explode, killing the couple
in the car, other innocent bystanders, and possibly the
walking couple, a common predictive inference among
those in the No-context condition was that the couple in
the car would have dinner with the walking couple.
Thus, the results indicate viewers in the two conditions
had radically different event models (i.e., comprehen-
sion) of the narrative in the film clip based on the con-
text they were given.2
Eye movements
Fixation durations and saccade lengths
Fixation durations and saccade lengths can be very sen-
sitive to manipulations of comprehension in reading at
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both local and global levels (Rayner, 1998), what is cur-
rently being fixated in scenes (Henderson & Pierce,
2008; Henderson & Smith, 2009), and manipulations of
task in dynamic scenes (Smith & Mital, 2013). The event
model hypothesis thus predicts there should be effects
of our comprehension manipulation on these basic eye-
movement metrics in the current study. Specifically,
based on the logic that Context condition participants
will hold knowledge of the bomb in their event model,
the Event Model hypothesis would predict that when the
car with the bomb is on the screen they should have
tighter gaze on the car. This should result in shorter sac-
cades and longer fixations. The inclusion of these mea-
sures should give a fuller picture of the eye-movement
results to help interpret the effects for gaze similarity
and region of interest below.
All eye-movement data were first cleaned by removing
the longest and shortest 1% of fixation durations and
saccade lengths for each participant. We then compared
the mean fixation durations and saccade lengths between
the Context and No-context groups for the shared view-
ing period. There were no significant differences in fix-
ation duration between the two conditions. In the
Context condition, the average fixation duration was
slightly descriptively longer than the No-context condi-
tion (Table 1), but not significantly different (t (82) =
0.438, p = 0.662; intersaccadic interval 1° cleaning, t (82)
= 0.888, p = 0.377). There was substantial evidence for
the null hypothesis (BF01 = 5.48). The effect was the
same when only participants in the Context condition
who made the inference were compared to the No-
context condition (t (73) = 0.318, p = 0.751; intersaccadic
cleaning, t (73) = 0.772, p = 0.443). There was again sub-
stantial evidence for the null hypothesis (BF01 = 5.33).
The average saccade length for the Context group was
descriptively longer than for the No-context group, and
marginally significant (t (82) = 1.848, p = 0.068, d = 0.41;
intersaccadic cleaning, t (82) = 1.892, p = 0.062). The
Bayes factor only showed anecdotal evidence for the null
hypothesis (BF01 = 1.25). When only Context condition
participants who made the inference were included the
effect of condition and inference on saccade lengths was
significant (t (73) = 2.089, p = 0.040; intersaccadic clean-
ing, t (73) = 0.2.168, p = 0.033). Thus, Table 1 shows par-
ticipants in the context condition who made the
inference had longer saccade lengths compared to the
No-context condition, though this was a small-to-
medium effect (d = 0.489).
Longer saccade lengths usually show greater explor-
ation of a scene (Pannasch, Helmert, Roth, Herbold, &
Walter, 2008; Smith & Mital, 2013), which makes it sur-
prising the Context group that made the inference
would explore more. They have the best understanding
of the narrative presented, and many of them maintained
the bomb in their event model throughout the clip. This
should create suspense that would guide their eye move-
ments towards the car with the bomb, which should the-
oretically result in shorter saccade lengths. Bezdek et al.
(2015) showed in an fMRI study that suspense in film
narrows attentional focus. A potential alternative explan-
ation is that the Context participants who made the in-
ference did explore the scene more to look for potential
effects of a bomb explosion. Also, there is the possibility
that, due to their relatively good comprehension for the
narrative, Context participants that made the inference
were under less cognitive load to maintain the narrative,
which gave them the opportunity to explore the screen
more. This may be similar to a person watching a film
for the second or third time, and noticing things they
hadn’t in previous viewings because they don’t have to
follow the narrative as closely. Nevertheless, this differ-
ence in saccade lengths was a relatively small effect, so
the above interpretations must be made cautiously.
Gaze similarity
Data pre-processing Comparing the spatiotemporal
distribution of gaze between viewing conditions in dy-
namic media is more difficult than in static scenes as
traditional scanpath comparison methods assume that
the stimulus does not change during viewing (e.g., Scan-
match; Cristino, Mathot, Theeuwes & Gilchrist, 2010).
Instead, a method based on comparison of gaze heat-
maps between conditions on a frame-by-frame basis can
be used. (Note that, for this reason, it is not necessary to
Table 1 Experiment 1 and 2 fixation duration and saccade
length descriptive statistics
Experiment Condition Mean SD
Fixation durations Milliseconds
Experiment 1 Context (inference) 391 68
No-context 386 63
Experiment 2a Context (inference) 367 57
Context (no-inference) 378 70
No-context 398 82
Experiment 2b Map task 361 47
Saccade lengths Degrees
Experiment 1 Context (inference) 4.89 .58
No-context 4.63 .66
Experiment 2a Context (inference) 4.89 .61
Context (no-inference) 4.65 .74
No-context 4.69 .82
Experiment 2b Map task 5.39 .68
The descriptive statistics are only presented for the main analyses run. The
analyses run with different cleaning methods did change the mean values for
fixation durations and saccade lengths, but since the interpretations did not
change based on the inferential statistics those means are not presented
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clean out potential smooth pursuit eye movements, since
the analysis simply calculates each viewer’s mean gaze
position during that 1/30th of a second [i.e., 33 ms].)
Gaze heatmaps represent the probabilistic spatial distri-
bution of raw gaze points within a viewing condition
and can be compared across conditions to statistically
confirm qualitatively observable changes in heatmaps
over time (e.g., tightening of gaze clusters = moments of
attentional synchrony) and differences between heatmaps
(i.e., when gaze similarity is high or low). Such heatmap
comparison methods have become the standard in dy-
namic scene viewing research (Peters, Iyer, Itti, & Koch,
2005; Dorr et al., 2010; Caldara & Miellet, 2011; Loschky
et al., 2015). The method used here is an adaptation of the
Normalized Scanpath Saliency (NSS) first proposed by Pe-
ters et al. (2005) and extended to video by Dorr et al.
(2010) (for full details of the method and equations, see
Dorr et al. (2010) and Loschky et al. (2015)). Our gaze
similarity derivation of NSS is preferable over alternative
methods of comparing the distribution of gaze between
two groups. For example, the alternative of averaging the
separate Pearson correlations of gaze X and Y coordinates
would ignore the 2D nature of the data at a particular mo-
ment, and also produce similarly high correlations
whether each distribution is tightly clustered or not. The
gaze similarity measure also allows us to use inferential
statistics to identify moments when the gaze distributions
between two groups differ in time, allowing for direct tests
of the Event Model hypothesis.
The NSS method was modified for the analysis here in
two critical ways. First, to calculate inter-observer simi-
larity within the reference condition (in this case, the
Context condition since it is the originally intended
viewing condition by the filmmaker), a probability map
is created by down-sampling the raw eye-tracking data
to 33 Hz (from 1000 Hz) to express raw eye fixation X/Y
coordinates per video frame, and exclude saccades and
blinks (periods when visual encoding is absent). A 2D
circular Gaussian (1.2° SD; roughly equivalent to the
fovea) is then plotted around each raw gaze location and
temporally averaged over a 225-ms moving time window
(to roughly approximate the duration of an average fix-
ation) for all but one participant within the Context con-
dition. These Gaussians are summed and normalized
relative to the mean and SD of these values across the
entire Context condition, to see how the similarity fluctu-
ates over time (z-score similarity = (Raw values −Mean)/
SD). The gaze location of the remaining participant is then
sampled from this distribution (i.e., a z-score is calculated
for this participant) to identify how their gaze fits within
the distribution at that moment. This “leave-one-out” pro-
cedure is repeated for all participants within the Context
condition until each participant has a z-scored value (re-
ferred to as “gaze similarity” here). These values express
both 1) how each individual gaze location fits within the
group at that moment, and 2) how the average gaze simi-
larity across all participants at that moment differs from
other times in the video: a z-score close to zero indicates
average synchrony, negative values indicate less synchrony
than the mean (i.e., more variance), and positive values in-
dicate more synchrony.
Second, the method is extended to allow gaze from
different viewing conditions (e.g., No-context) to be
sampled from a reference distribution (Context). For
each gaze point in the No-context condition, the prob-
ability that it belongs to the Context condition’s distribu-
tion is identified by sampling the value at that location
from the Context’s probability distribution (this time
leave-one-out is not used as the gaze does not belong to
the same distribution so cannot be sampled twice). The
resulting raw NSS values for No-context are then nor-
malized to the reference condition. Importantly, if the
two distributions are identical, the average z-scored
similarity for both distributions will fluctuate together,
expressing more (positive z-score) or less (negative z-
score) gaze similarity together over time (Fig. 2). How-
ever, as the similarity score is derived from the reference
distribution, if the two distributions differ significantly,
we cannot know if this is because the comparison dis-
tribution has more versus less gaze clustering than the
reference distribution. We can only say that the com-
parison distribution differs more from the reference dis-
tribution than the reference distribution differs from
itself. For example, both gaze distributions could be
tightly clustered but in different, non-overlapping parts
of the screen or the comparison distribution could be
more spread out and only partly overlap with the tight
reference distribution. Both situations would result in
significant differences between the distributions.
To address this ambiguity of the gaze similarity meas-
ure, we also include three other gaze measures in our
analyses. Specifically, we include two common measures
of attentional synchrony, sum-weighted gaze covariance
and number of gaze clusters (Mital et al., 2010), to deter-
mine the degree to which gaze in each group was tightly
clustered (We report these later for all experiments and
groups in Fig. 8.) We also report region of interest ana-
lyses to determine the degree to which gaze goes to spe-
cific regions in each condition. By including all four gaze
measures (gaze similarity, sum-weighted gaze covari-
ance, number of gaze clusters, and the car region of
interest analysis), we can disambiguate the sources of
differences in gaze similarity.
Additionally, a shuffled baseline was created to dem-
onstrate the gaze similarity that would be observed if eye
movements were randomly distributed during the clip
(given the constraints of normal eye movements within
that clip). The shuffled baseline started with the Context
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group. Because the gaze similarity values are calculated
based on each participant’s gaze location on each film
frame, the order of frames for each participant (and thus
the order of their eye movements across frames) was
shuffled. In other words, for the first frame of the film,
instead of having each participant’s first fixation the
shuffled baseline may have one participant’s first fixation,
a second participant’s 356th fixation, and another’s 22nd,
etc. This new gaze distribution was then compared to
the reference distribution (i.e., Context) in the same
method described above. This created a chance baseline
of gaze similarity which represents a floor value of simi-
larity for each participant at every frame against which
all other conditions can be compared. Importantly, since
the shuffled baseline was created from eye movements
from the same participants in the same clip, any biases
within the clip (e.g., center bias or certain characters
staying on a specific side of the scene) would be in the
baseline as well. These frame-by-frame gaze similarity z-
scores for each participant and condition (including the
shuffled baseline) were then analyzed to identify differ-
ences in gaze similarity across conditions.
Gaze similarity results As shown in Fig. 2, the first
gaze similarity analysis compared the Context and No-
context conditions across the entirety of the shared
viewing period of the film clip that overlapped across
conditions (i.e., the 2 minutes and 54 seconds of film,
starting just after the bomb was placed in the car).
Qualitatively, looking at Fig. 2 one can see that gaze
similarity scores between the Context and No-context
groups generally overlap throughout the film clip, indi-
cating that, regardless of context condition, viewers
likely did not differ in their overall gaze similarity. A t-
test of mean gaze similarity between groups averaged
across all frames supported this qualitative assessment (t
(80) = 1.081, p = 0.283; d = 0.241), indicating that know-
ledge of the bomb did not have an effect on overall
viewer gaze similarity. Additionally, the Bayes factor
showed substantial evidence for the null (BF01 = 3.45),
namely support for the Tyranny of Film hypothesis. The
results are similar when participants who did not make
the inference in the Context condition are removed from
the analysis (t (71) = 0.592, p = 0.556). Next, we included
the shuffled baseline for comparison. As shown in Fig. 2,
Fig. 2 Top: Similarity of gaze by context condition across the shared viewing period of the clip. Gaze similarity is expressed as a z-score probability
relative to the Context condition. (Context [blue], No-context [orange], and shuffled baseline [black]). Large values indicate greater gaze similarity.
Bottom: Three of the peaks in gaze similarity are illustrated by image frames with superimposed heat maps of participant gaze location. The frames
show the gaze heat maps at the points indicated on the gaze similarity figure for both the Context and No-context conditions. Frames a and c show
high gaze similarity, while frame b shows low gaze similarity. Note that frame c was the single highest level of attentional synchrony in the entire film
clip. Gaze heatmaps produced by CARPE (Computational and Algorithmic Representation and Processing of Eye-movements; Mital et al., 2010)
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when the experimental groups’ gaze similarity is above
the shuffled baseline, it indicates that gaze is more clus-
tered than would be predicted by chance, possibly due
to either the bottom-up features of the film or all
viewers’ mental models systematically guiding their eye
movements. This qualitative assessment was confirmed
by adding the shuffled baseline to the ANOVA for con-
dition, which produced a significant effect (F (2, 122) =
73.727, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.551). Bonferroni corrected
pairwise comparisons indicated that both the Context
(mean (M) = −0.001, SD = 0.267) and No-context (M =
−0.067, SD = 0.290) conditions had significantly greater
gaze similarity than the shuffled baseline (M = −0.561,
SD = 0.034). Importantly, Fig. 2 shows that this quantita-
tive difference in gaze similarity from chance was highly
systematic. For example, Fig. 2b shows the time point
with the lowest gaze similarity, which shows a busy
street scene with many people, goats, cars, and building
signs to look at. Conversely, Fig. 2c shows the moment
of highest gaze similarity, which is when the walking
couple kiss, at the center of the screen, and there is
nothing else of interest to look at (i.e., only a non-
descript architectural background). Therefore, one can-
not attribute the null effect of context on gaze similarity
to the gaze similarity measure being insensitive to varia-
tions in attentional synchrony. On the contrary, Fig. 2,
and comparisons with the shuffled baseline, shows that
the gaze similarity measure was very sensitive to mo-
ments when one would predict to find lesser (Fig. 2b) or
greater (Fig. 2c) attentional synchrony.
Region of interest
Data pre-processing Dynamic regions of interest were
created for the clip to test whether either condition
looked more at the car with the bomb in it. To create
the dynamic region of interest for the car, we used
Gazeatron (Vo et al., 2012) to identify the rectangular
x,y pixel coordinates for the car on the screen for each
frame (at 30 frames/s). These pixel coordinates were
then exported and combined with the raw fixation re-
port from EyeLink DataViewer (SR Research). This was
used to calculate the cumulative dwell time and mean
number of fixations for each participant in the car re-
gion of interest. One-second time bins were used, and
fixations were counted for the time bin they ended in
(i.e., if a fixation went across time bins, it was only
counted for the time bin it was in when the next saccade
was generated).
Region of interest results While gaze similarity is a
metric that indicates the co-occurrence of eye movements
in space and time, it does not indicate the features of a
scene that are being attended to. The region of interest
analysis remedies this by indicating how much a specific
object in a scene, here the car with the bomb in it, is
attended to. The Event Model hypothesis predicted that
the car with the bomb would be of greater importance to
participants in the Context condition, because they are
aware of the potential destructive causal effects the car
could have on nearby persons, places, and things.
As illustrated in Fig. 3, as with the gaze similarity ana-
lysis, fixations on the car by viewers in the two context
conditions were compared for the shared viewing time
from the start time of the No-context condition when
both conditions were seeing the exact same information.
The region of interest was used to calculate the mean
number of fixations when the car was present on the
screen within 30-frame (1 s) time bins.
As with the gaze similarity analyses, Fig. 3 shows the
lines for the two context conditions are mostly overlap-
ping, indicating that, regardless of the context condition,
participants fixated the car at the same time points
throughout the clip. A t-test comparing the proportion
of fixations on the car between each condition was not
statistically significant (t (82) = 1.73, p = 0.087; d = 0.382),
and the Bayes factor showed anecdotal evidence for the
null, namely the Tyranny of Film hypothesis (BF01 =
1.52). The non-significant trend was for the No-context
condition to have a higher proportion of fixations (M =
0.098, SD = 0.045) on the car than the Context group
(M = 0.082, SD = 0.036), which is in the opposite direc-
tion of what was predicted. The result was the same
when only those members of the Context condition who
made the inference were included (t (73) = 1.434, p =
0.156; d = 0.316), which also showed anecdotal evidence
for the null (BF01 = 2.21). Overall, this indicates that the
viewers without knowledge of the bomb fixated the car
at a similar rate to those with knowledge of it.
Discussion
The context manipulation had an impact on comprehen-
sion in that participants in the Context condition were
more likely to predict that the car would explode than
those in the No-context condition. However, context
had only one modest effect on eye movements. Saccade
lengths were slightly longer for participants in the Con-
text condition that made the inference about the bomb.
This could potentially be argued to support the hypoth-
esis that Context participants explored the scene more.
However, all other eye-movement measures showed no
effect. This included gaze similarity, which should pick
up on one condition exploring the scene more than the
other. These results therefore mostly support the Tyr-
anny of Film hypothesis (Loschky et al., 2015). This is
despite the fact that, as shown in Fig. 8, the Touch of Evil
film clip produced less gaze clustering than the Moon-
raker clip (Loschky et al., 2015), which we had predicted
due to the Touch of Evil clip lacking cuts but including
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numerous objects in the film frame to look at. This
stands in contrast to the lack of effect of strong compre-
hension differences on viewers’ eye movements. Thus,
our predicted reduction of gaze similarity in the Touch
of Evil film clip in comparison to the Moonraker film
clip was nevertheless not enough to allow a strong dif-
ference in comprehension between context conditions to
produce meaningful differences in eye movements.
One potential problem with experiment 1 was that the
No-context condition and the Context condition both
show the car at the beginning of the scene, and in par-
ticular a couple getting into the car. First mentioned en-
tities have a special status in event models for text
narratives (e.g., Gernsbacher, 1990). As such, the car was
likely prominent in the event models for both the Con-
text and No-context conditions, which may have led to
similar eye movements in both conditions, regardless of
whether they had knowledge of the bomb.
Experiments 2a and 2b: eye-tracking with new
No-context condition and map task
In order to address the potential first mention
(Gernsbacher, 1990) issue that viewers in the No-context
condition may have treated the characters in the car as
protagonists, and therefore paid close attention to the car
even though they did not know it contained a bomb, a
new No-context condition was used. In the new No-
context condition, viewers began watching the clip only
after the walking couple entered the street and the car was
off-screen (Fig. 1; image 5 marked “No-context: Exp. 2”).
Thus, viewers in the new No-context condition should
treat the walking couple as the protagonists. Viewers in
the Context condition started watching the clip from the
beginning as before.
Experiment 2b was conducted to demonstrate that the
Tyranny of Film effect can be broken when there are
strong endogenous factors affecting attention. Previous
research has shown higher level cognition has large on-
line effects on eye movements during scene viewing
(Foulsham & Underwood, 2007; Henderson, Brockmole,
Castelhano, & Mack, 2007; Henderson, Shinkareva, Wang,
Luke, & Olejarczyk, 2013). These effects have also been
shown more recently in “natural film” (i.e., unedited real-
world video), such as trying to determine the location
depicted in a video (Smith & Mital, 2013), and in edited
narrative film, such as taking different film viewing per-
spectives (Lahnakoski et al., 2014). We therefore predicted
viewer eye movements in the Touch of Evil clip would
similarly be affected by a cognitive task that was designed
to be specifically at odds with understanding the narrative,
Fig. 3 Top: Proportion of participants fixating the car by context condition throughout the film clip (shown here in 3-s bins due to resolution
limitations of the figure). The higher the value, the more participants were looking at the car. Bottom: Film stills show the region of interest for
the frame, with fixation and heat maps superimposed. Still set a shows a time point when the car was fixated by most participants, and set b
shows when the car was minimally fixated. Note that frame a shows the single highest proportion of viewers fixating the car region of interest,
which was at the start of the common viewing period across both context conditions
Hutson et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2017) 2:46 Page 13 of 30
specifically a map drawing task that involved creating a
map of the narrative spatial environment. That is, eye
movements for viewers under instruction to draw a map
would be different than those of participants processing
the film clip in order to comprehend it. Moreover, those
eye movements under the map task would be at regions of




For experiment 2a, data were collected from 201 stu-
dents enrolled in an introductory psychology course at
Kansas State University for course research credit. Data
from eight participants were dropped because of pro-
gram errors during data collection, for not completing
the questions at the end of the experiment, or for having
participated in an earlier experiment using Touch of Evil.
Data from the remaining 193 participants (age M =
19.5 years, female = 59.2%) were included in the analyses.
Participants were pseudo-randomly assigned to either
the Context condition (n = 131) or the new No-context
condition (n = 62 participants) with the constraint that
we have roughly twice as many participants in the Con-
text condition, based on the assumption (from experiment
1 and further comprehension experiments (Hutson et
al., Working memory span and film comprehension: Ef-
fects on high-level inference generation, in preparation))
that roughly 50% of them would fail to generate a bomb-
relevant predictive inference at the end of the film clip.
Based on this assumption, we expected to end up with
three roughly equally sized groups of participants: Context
condition + Inference, Context condition +No-inference,
and No-context condition +No-inference.
For experiment 2b data were collected from an add-
itional 75 participants. For this additional experimental
condition, a priori criteria were created to select which
participants would be included in analyses based on
performance on a map drawing task described below.
First, the Gardony Map Analyzer was used to score par-
ticipants’ maps for accuracy (Gardony, Taylor, & Bru-
nyé, 2015), and only participants with scores greater
than or equal to the median were included in any of
the analyses (see “Data analysis” section for specifics on
the Gardony Map Analyzer and Additional file 1: Ap-
pendix B for example maps with scores). Second, only
participants that did not make the inference about the
bomb at the end of the clip were included in the eye-
movement analyses. This is because one purpose of the
map task was to make the narrative irrelevant, and par-
ticipants able to make the inference about the bomb
must have attended to the narrative. This resulted in a
total of 37 comparison group participants being
included in eye-movement data analyses. Future ana-
lyses may look at more fine-grained comparisons of all
of these participants using map scores as a continuous
predictor of eye-movement variability.
Stimuli
The same opening scene from Touch of Evil was used in
experiment 2, but no audio was presented with the clip.
This decision was made because the goal of this research
is to explore how narrative comprehension affects eye
movements, and we became aware that the film included
dialogue in the last 15 seconds of the clip to subtly re-
mind viewers of the bomb.3 Since the dialogue occurred
at the end of the clip, it could not have an effect on the
majority of the eye movements in the majority of the
clip. However, removing the subtle reminder of the
bomb allows us to make a cleaner comparison of the eye
movements of those viewers in the Context condition
who did versus did not mention the bomb in their pre-
dictive inferences. The clip used for the Context condi-
tion was otherwise identical to that used in experiment
1. The new No-context condition saw a different version
of the clip that started 1 minute and 49 seconds into the
opening scene, at a point when the walking couple was
shown alone on the screen, with the car off-screen. The
same display set up from experiment 1 was used in ex-
periments 2a and 2b.
Procedure
Experiment 2a procedures were identical to those of ex-
periment 1. With respect to experiment 2b, all stimuli
and procedures were identical to the Context condition
in experiment 2a except for the inclusion of the map
task. Specifically, all participants were presented the
Context version of the film clip. However, before pres-
entation of the clip, participants were given the map
task instructions to draw a detailed map of the loca-
tions in the scene, including labels, at the end of the
clip from memory (full instructions in Additional file 1:
Appendix A). After watching the clip, they were
prompted to make the inference about what would
happen next. After this they were given an 8 1/2” by
11” sheet of paper to draw a map from memory with
the instructions printed at the top and grid lines for the
map. They had 5 minutes to complete their map.
Data analysis
Predictive inference coding procedures were identical to
experiment 1. Experiments 2a and 2b had high interrater
reliability. For both Cohen’s Kappa = 0.954, p < 0.001.
Discrepancies were resolved through discussion.
To score the maps, we used the automated Gardony
Map Analyzer (Gardony et al., 2015). This starts with a
master configuration map given as input to the software
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with all relevant locations labeled. Then, each partici-
pant’s drawn map is scanned, input to the software, its
labeled locations are marked, and it is compared to the
master map and given a similarity score. We used the
SQRT (canonical accuracy) measure in the Gardony
Map Analyzer (Gardony et al., 2015), which is a general
measure that scores both on the number and configur-
ation of landmarks. To create the master configuration
map, Google Earth was used to find the actual streets (in
Venice, CA, USA) on which the opening scene of Touch
of Evil was filmed.4 Within the layout of the actual
street, each of the locations in the clip was placed as ac-
curately as possible to its location on the Google Map.
This gave us an objectively accurate map of the scene,
which would give participants who drew the most accur-
ate maps the highest scores using the map analyzer.
Results
Overview
As with experiment 1, the results of experiment 2a
showed a strong comprehension effect. Bayes dfactors
again showed that the majority of eye-movement mea-
sures supported the null (saccade lengths, gaze similarity,
region of interest). However, the Context participants had
longer fixation durations, and there was a targeted effect
of looks at the car with the bomb the first time it is on the
screen for No-context participants. During this time Con-
text participants are more likely to look at the car than
No-context. Overall, these results generally support the
Tyranny of Film, but indicate there may be localized ef-
fects of comprehension on eye movements.
Experiment 2b introduced the map task to test if the
Tyranny of Film could be turned off. Fixation duration,
gaze similarity, and region of interest results all showed
differences between the comprehension and map task
conditions, which showed a break in the Tyranny of
Film. There was not a complete dissociation in the at-
tentional selection between the two conditions; thus,
these results indicate that a task at odds with compre-
hension (i.e., the map task) can turn down the Tyranny
of Film. These results show our measures are sensitive
to differences in eye movements, and as a result that our
null effects based on comprehension differences are
likely true null effects (i.e., not the result of a weak ma-
nipulation or insensitive measures).
Experiment 2a Results
Predictive inference
The results of this analysis largely replicated the results
of experiment 1 with the Context condition more likely
to make a bomb-relevant inference (X2 (1, N = 193) =
46.39, p < 0.001, η = 0.490). Almost exactly half of the
participants in the Context condition made a bomb-
relevant inference (65 participants made the inference
and 66 did not). The decrease in the frequency of infer-
ence from experiment 1 could be attributed to the ab-
sence of audio. This afforded a cleaner analysis
comparing the eye movements of participants in the
context conditions that did or did not generate the pre-
diction. No participants in the No-context condition
made the inference. Thus, data in all the following ana-
lyses are in terms of three groups: the Context partici-
pants that made the inference (Context + Inference), the
Context participants that did not make the inference
(Context + No-inference), and the No-context group.
Eye movements
Fixation durations and saccade lengths Data cleaning
followed the same procedure as experiment 1. The ef-
fects were reversed when compared to experiment 1.
There was a marginal effect of group on fixation dur-
ation (F (2, 191) = 3.79, p = 0.024, ηp2 = 0.038; intersac-
cadic cleaning, F (2, 191) = 2.869, p = 0.059). The Bayes
factor shows anecdotal evidence for the null (BF01 =
1.55). To describe the relationship, Tukey HSD post hoc
comparisons for the analysis without intersaccadic inter-
val cleaning indicated that the Context + Inference group
had the shortest average fixation duration, which was
significantly shorter (p = 0.026) than the No-context
group (Table 1). The Context + No-inference group was
not different from either of the other groups. There were
no differences in average saccade length (F (2, 191) =
0.905, p = 0.406, ηp2 = 0.009; intersaccadic cleaning, F (2,
191) = 1.602, p = 0.204), with substantial evidence of the
null shown by the Bayes factor (BF01 = 8.56). Descrip-
tively, the Context + Inference group had longer saccade
lengths than both the Context + No-inference group and
the No-context group (Table 1). Interestingly, the magni-
tudes of the mean saccade lengths for the Context + In-
ference and No-context groups were very similar to
those in experiment 1, which showed a significant differ-
ence, but a small-to-medium effect size. The only differ-
ences in these results between experiments 1 and 2 were
that the mean saccade length of the No-context group
increased from 4.63° (experiment 1) to 4.69° (experiment
2a), and the SDs for both groups were larger in experi-
ment 2. In sum, the small effect of context on saccade
amplitudes was replicated from experiment 1, but our
caution in interpreting the effect in experiment 1 ap-
pears to have been justified as it failed to reach statistical
significance this time.
Shorter fixation durations for the Context group that
made the inference match the effect between fixation
durations and comprehension during reading. Specific-
ally, fixation durations tend to be shorter when a person
has a better understanding for what they are reading
(Rayner, 1998). In the current experiment, participants
in the Context condition that made the inference show a
Hutson et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2017) 2:46 Page 15 of 30
high level of comprehension for the narrative and poten-
tially shorter fixation durations. An alternative explan-
ation is that Context participants may be exploring the
scene more, which is usually associated with shorter fix-
ation durations (Pannasch et al., 2008; Smith & Mital,
2013). The comparison of the effects of context and in-
ference on mean fixation durations and mean saccade
lengths in experiments 1 and 2 shows a pattern of small
effects which slightly change between experiments, but
are roughly the same. Because these effects are small,
they can vary from being statistically significant to not
significant, or vice versa, from one experiment to the
other. Overall, we must treat these results with caution.
Gaze similarity The same data pre-processing proced-
ure from experiment 1 was used for experiments 2a and
2b. As with experiment 1, the first analysis run was an
omnibus test for gaze differences between the Context
and No-context groups across the viewing of the critical
portion of the film clip (the same 1 minute and 49 sec-
onds of the clip that both groups saw). During this crit-
ical portion of the clip, there were no group differences
(F (2, 190) = 0.05, p = 0.955). The Bayes factor showed
strong evidence for the null (BF01 = 18.07), replicating
experiment 1. Figure 4 shows that the lines indicating
gaze similarity for each group are nearly identical, indi-
cating that the tendency for viewers to look at the same
places at the same times was the same across groups.
Again, a shuffled baseline was included for comparison
for the shared viewing period. Overall, the gaze similarity
of all three experimental groups was generally above the
shuffled baseline, indicating that the film was guiding
eye movements, potentially creating the Tyranny of Film.
Including the shuffled baseline in the ANOVA was sta-
tistically significant (F (3, 254) = 55.23, p < 0.001, ηp2 =
0.395), with all experimental groups higher than the ran-
dom baseline, also replicating the results of experiment
1. In addition, Fig. 4 shows that experiment 2 replicated
the systematic peaks and troughs of gaze similarity
across the entire film clip, including the familiar peak of
gaze similarity at the end of the clip (previously shown
in Fig. 2c) when the walking couple kiss. Thus, despite
replicating a null effect of context on gaze similarity, the
gaze similarity measure was highly sensitive to changes
in attention across the film clip.
These results indicate that viewers’ understanding of
the clip did not influence their gaze similarity. Even
when viewers knew about the bomb or thought the car
and the couple in it were the main characters of the film
clip, they viewed the clip similarly to viewers who did
not. However, we cannot explain this null effect in terms
of the film clip failing to guide eye movements because
overall gaze similarity was significantly and meaningfully
well above chance for all three groups, and systematic-
ally related to the film content (e.g., the kiss). Thus, the
film did influence viewers’ attention very systematically,
but the differences in viewers’ comprehension between
groups had no influence on their gaze similarity.
Fig. 4 Similarity of gaze by context condition across the shared viewing period of the clip that starts on frame 2519 (thus, the figure appears
different from Fig. 2). Gaze similarity is expressed as a z-score probability relative to the context condition and inference made (Context + Inference
[blue], Context + No-Inference [green], No-context [orange], and shuffled baseline [black]). Larger values indicate greater attentional synchrony.
The shuffled baseline (black) indicates chance level gaze similarity for the clip
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Region of interest The same region of interest data
pre-processing as in experiment 1 was used. The car was
identified as the region of interest, and we tested
whether our three viewing groups differentially looked at
it. The region of interest analyses again started using the
entire shared viewing period, and then an a priori time
point of interest based on the manipulation of protago-
nists/agents.
The omnibus region of interest analysis started the
first time the car appeared on the screen in the No-
context condition, 1 minute and 57 seconds into the film
clip. Overall, there were no significant differences be-
tween the three groups in how often they fixated the car
during this viewing period (F (2, 190) = 1.07, p = 0.345;
Fig. 5). There was strong evidence for the null hypoth-
esis (BF01 = 7.40). This is in line with the gaze similarity
analysis, indicating that the manipulation of both know-
ledge of the bomb and the protagonists had no effect on
viewers’ overall likelihood of looking at the car.
We next carried out a more specific a priori region of
interest analysis to probe a critical time period when the
manipulation of protagonist might be expected to have
an effect on fixations of the car. This was the 8-second
period when the car with the bomb was first seen by
participants in the No-context condition. At that point
in the narrative, the walking couple walks past the car,
which is stationary because a crowd of pedestrians has
blocked the street. For viewers in the No-context condi-
tion, the car should have no particular importance, but
for viewers in the Context condition, it should already
be an integral component of their event model, regard-
less of whether the bomb is still active in their event
model or not. Thus, in line with the eye–mind hypoth-
esis (Just & Carpenter, 1980; Reichle, Pollatsek, Fisher, &
Rayner, 1998; Reilly & Radach, 2006), the event model
hypothesis would predict that the Context condition
viewers would be more likely to look at the car than the
No-context condition, at least initially. To test this pre-
diction, we created an 8-second time window from when
the car first appeared (frame 2758) and right before it
was briefly occluded from view again (frame 3028), and
we then measured the proportion of fixations of the car
for each group. A one-way (group, Context + Inference
vs. Context + No-inference vs. No-context) between sub-
jects ANOVA found a main effect of viewing group on
proportion of fixations on the car during the pre-
specified 8-second time window (F (2, 190) = 3.93, p =
0.021, ηp2 = 0.04). As illustrated in Fig. 5, the Tukey
HSD procedure indicated that viewers in the No-context
group were significantly less likely to fixate the car (M =
0.054, SD = 0.078) than those in the Context + Inference
group (M = 0.098, SD = 0.086) (p = 0.02). There was also
a non-significant trend (p = 0.06) for viewers in the Con-
text + No-inference group to fixate the car less than
viewers in the Context + Inference group (M = 0.093, SD
= 0.122). This provided the first support for the influ-
ence of the event model on predictable gaze behavior in
the Touch of Evil film clip. Viewers who knew about the
Fig. 5 Proportion of participants fixating the car by context condition and inference throughout the film clip (Context + Inference [blue], Context
+ No-inference [green], and No-context + No-inference [orange]). The higher the value, the more participants looking at the car. The first appearance
of car for No-context group is marked with vertical dotted lines
Hutson et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2017) 2:46 Page 17 of 30
bomb and already had the car in their event model were
more likely to fixate the car during its first appearance
within the critical period than participants who had not
indexed the car (and the couple in it) as protagonists, or
more generally, important agents in the narrative. We
will refer to this as evidence of the “agent effect”, as it
seems to be due to whether viewers treat an entity in
the narrative as an “agent” or not.
In general, experiment 2a showed support for the Tyr-
anny of Film with there being no overall differences in
gaze distribution across the different inference condi-
tions. The fixation duration effect may indicate that
Context + Inference participants are under less cognitive
load than No-context participants, which is consistent
with what is expected for participants with better com-
prehension (Rayner, 1998), but we treat this result with
caution. The agency effect, reported for the region of
interest analysis demonstrates the potential for gaze to
be influenced by an object’s relevance to the viewer’s
event model, but the fleeting nature of this effect sug-
gests that the motivation for such top-down control may
need to be stronger and more deliberate during film
viewing than has been demonstrated in static scene
viewing (DeAngelus & Pelz, 2009; Smith & Mital, 2013;
Yarbus, 1967) due to the bottom-up saliency of film.
Given our pattern of null effects of comprehension (i.e.,
context and inference) on eye movements, experiment
2b was conducted to test whether it was possible to get
strong positive effects of cognition on eye movements
with our stimuli and measures. This tests whether the
previous experiments are showing a true overall null ef-
fect of comprehension on eye movements, or if there
may simply be a problem with our stimuli or measures.
Experiment 2b Results
Eye-movement analyses compared participants in the
map task to participants in the Comprehension group.
The Comprehension group contained only those par-
ticipants in the Context condition who generated the
predictive inference, because those participants demon-
strated the filmmaker’s intended comprehension of the
scene. The Map task group participants were those at or
above the median map score who did not make the pre-
dictive inference about the bomb. These two groups rep-
resent participants that most successfully completed
their task: to comprehend the narrative or to create a
mental map of the scene.
Predictive inference
Inference data were initially analyzed for all 75 partici-
pants that completed the map task. The inference results
for the Map task condition were compared to those of
the Comprehension group. Participants in the Map task
condition were less likely to make the inference about
the bomb (mean proportion = 0.13) than those in the
Comprehension group (mean proportion = 0.50, (X2 (1,
N = 205) = 27.56, p < 0.001, η = 0.367). Rerunning the
analysis for only the Map task participants that were in-
cluded in the eye-movement analyses based on their
map score showed the same effect (mean proportion =
0.10, (X2 (1, N = 171) = 20.974, p < 0.001, η = 0.350). This
indicates that the map task was cognitively at odds with
the process of narrative comprehension (i.e., participants
had identical visual information available, including see-
ing the bomb put in the car, but processed it differently
to complete their given tasks). The key question is
whether part of the difference in processing was the de-
ployment of overt visual attention as measured by eye
movements.
Eye movements
Fixation durations and saccade lengths All data were
cleaned using the same procedures as outlined in experi-
ment 1. For fixation durations, there were no significant
differences between the groups. In the Comprehension
group the average fixation duration was descriptively lon-
ger (Table 1) than the Map task group, but not statistically
significant (t (100) = 0.695, p = 0.489; intersaccadic clean-
ing, t (100) = 0.672, p = 0.503). There was strong evidence
of no difference in mean fixation durations between the
Comprehension and Map task groups (BF01 = 5.27).
Mean saccade length between groups, however, did
show a significant difference. Consistent with our hy-
potheses based on the results of Lahnakoski et al. (2014)
and Smith and Mital (2013), average saccades were sig-
nificantly longer in the Map task group than in the
Comprehension group (Table 1) (t (100) = 4.56, p <
0.001; d = 0.91; intersaccadic cleaning, t (100) = 3.349, p
< 0.001; d = 0.66). We hypothesized that this would
occur because the Map task participants would make
longer saccades in order to explore the edges of the
scene to complete their task, thereby (at least partially)
ignoring the main characters of the narrative that are
typically shown near the center of the screen, which
would require shorter saccades to explore.
Gaze similarity The gaze similarity analysis compared
Comprehension group participants to those in the Map
task group across the entirety of the film clip. Figure 6
shows the results of this comparison.
Qualitatively, Fig. 6 shows that gaze similarity scores
for the Comprehension group are often higher than for
the Map task group, indicating that viewers in the Map
task group were looking at different places on those
given frames than the Comprehension group. To quan-
tify this relationship an ANOVA of mean gaze similarity
by group was calculated. Consistent with the qualitative
assessment of the figure, an ANOVA supports the
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difference between each group (F (2, 166) = 96.484, p <
0.001, ηp2 = 0.541), with Bonferroni-corrected pairwise
comparisons showing the Comprehension group had the
greatest gaze similarity (M = 0.001, SD = 0.266), followed
by the Map task (M = −0.284, SD = 0.234), and the shuf-
fled baseline (M = −0.488, SD = 0.045) was the lowest.
Nevertheless, Fig. 6 also shows that the Map task group
was frequently above the shuffled baseline, and mim-
icked many of the peaks and troughs of the Comprehen-
sion group. This supports the prediction that even when
the task is at odds with narrative comprehension, it may
be difficult to completely ignore areas associated with
the narrative. The Tyranny of Film is perhaps not being
turned off, but instead is being turned down.
In addition to the main effects, an inspection of Fig. 6
indicates that there may be an interaction of gaze
similarity with time. An exploratory, repeated measures
ANOVA of task and time in the clip was conducted to
better understand the role the features of the clip play in
determining gaze similarity. As noted in the “Back-
ground”, we chose the Touch of Evil film clip, in part,
because it has bottom-up filmic features that should re-
duce attentional synchrony. However, the presence of
visual features that may guide attention changes
throughout the clip. For the repeated measures ANOVA,
the clip was broken into quarters that correspond well
to the changes in visual features in the clip (more detail
on these features in the interpretation below). The
sphericity assumption was violated (X2 (5) = 36.077, p <
0.001); thus, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used
(Ɛ = 0.869). As with the one-way ANOVA, there was a
main effect of time block (F (2.60, 427.76) = 177.113, p <
Fig. 6 Top: Similarity of gaze by context condition across the full clip. Gaze similarity is expressed as a z-score probability relative to the context
condition and inference made (Comprehension group [blue], Map task [red], and shuffled baseline [black]). Large values indicate greater attentional
synchrony. Vertical dashed grey lines illustrate the quarters used in the repeated measures analysis. Bottom: The stills exemplify gaze patterns during
high gaze similarity (GS) for both groups (a), high GS for Comprehension, low for Map Task (b), and low GS for both (c)
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0.001, ηp2 = 0.519). Bonferroni-corrected pairwise com-
parisons showed that each time block was significantly
different from the others; block 1 had the highest gaze
similarity (M = −0.114, SD = 0.419), followed by block 2
(M = −0.227, SD = 0.355), then block 4 (M = −0.266, SD
= 0.313), and block 3 had the lowest gaze similarity (M
= −0.406, SD = 0.151). Additionally, the task by time
block interaction was significant (F (5.217, 427.758) =
71.430, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.466). The interaction was
probed using simple effects where time block was held
constant over task. The Greenhouse-Geisser corrected
omnibus error term was MSE = 0.016, and the df =
427.758. Gaze similarity differed between all tasks in
blocks 1, 2, and 4 (p values < 0.001, F values > 20.312; see
Additional file 1: Appendix C for full simple effects
structure). However, in block 3, the Map task and the
shuffled baseline were not significantly different (F (1,
427.758) = 2.375, p > 0.05), while all other task compari-
sons in block 3 were significantly different (p values <
0.001, F values > 34.187).
The main effect of time block and the interaction with
task support previous work on the features that guide at-
tentional synchrony when a qualitative analysis of the
features of a film clip in each block is used. As shown in
Fig. 6 (top), block 1 has the highest gaze similarity, and
qualitatively has features that would support this (Fig. 6,
bottom, a; e.g., close ups of the bomb and car, and rela-
tively little else to look at). Figure 6 shows that blocks 2
and 4, which have moderate levels of gaze similarity, also
have moderately more to look at (Fig. 6, bottom, b; e.g.,
more store fronts). Block 3 has the lowest gaze similar-
ity, and the most complex composition involving lots of
people, vehicles, goats, and store fronts (Fig. 6, bottom,
c). The complexity in block 3 is precisely what we pre-
dicted would reduce attentional synchrony overall when
we chose the Touch of Evil film clip (Bazin, 1967; Cut-
ting et al., 2011; D’Angelo, 2012; Mital et al., 2010; Yar-
bus, 1967). Additionally, the large number of storefronts
and spread out locations in block 3 is what would be
predicted to reduce gaze similarity in the map task, con-
sistent with the lack of a difference between the Map
task group and the shuffled baseline in block 3.
Region of interest The same region of interest data
pre-processing as in experiment 1 was used. The car was
identified as the region of interest, and we tested
whether participants in the Comprehension group fix-
ated the car more often than in the Map task group.
The region of interest analysis was carried out over the
entire viewing period.
As can be seen in Fig. 7, the red line for participants
that completed the map task is fairly consistently below
that of the blue line for the Comprehension group. A t-
test comparing the proportion of fixations of the car
(when on the screen) for each group confirmed that par-
ticipants in the Comprehension group fixated the car
significantly more often (10.2% of fixations) than partici-
pants in the Map task group (6.5% of fixations) (t (100)
= 3.706, p < 0.001; d = 0.74). A similar result was shown
when overall dwell time on the car was calculated for
each group. As with the proportion of fixations, the total
time spent on the car was larger for participants in the
Comprehension group (16.9 s, SD = 10.8 s) than for the
Map task group (11.6 s, SD = 7.1 s) (t (100) = 2.653, p =
0.009; d = 0.53). Thus, the comparison of the map and
comprehension tasks created a medium-to-large effect
for looks at the car.
Taken together, the region of interest results are con-
sistent with our predictions for the map task. The car is
integral for comprehension of the film clip, but is rela-
tively unimportant for completing the map task. Accord-
ingly, participants in the Comprehension group looked
at the car more than participants in the map task. As a
result, the region of interest results again show the Tyr-
anny of Film being reduced through the high level cog-
nitive task manipulation of the map task. Nevertheless,
as with the gaze similarity analysis above, participants in
the Map task condition still looked at the car occasion-
ally, indicating that the reduction of the Tyranny of Film
was relative, but not complete.
Discussion
Experiment 2a tested the role of context on comprehen-
sion and eye movements, and experiment 2b tested the
role of task. The results of 2a showed a limited effect of
comprehension, as manipulated by context, on eye
movements. That limited effect was primarily during a
critical period when there was a difference in the per-
ceived agents in the film, which affected visual attention.
To test whether the Tyranny of Film could be turned-off
by an explicit task at odds with comprehending the film
narrative, experiment 2b compared the Context + infer-
ence group with the Map Task condition. The results of
this comparison showed a statistically significant and
meaningful reduction in both the gaze similarity and
probability of looking at the chief region of interest (the
car) due to the task manipulation. Thus, we can say that
an explicit viewing task that was at odds with the task of
comprehension turned-down the Tyranny of Film. Be-
cause we showed experimentally induced variation in
the degree of the tyranny of film, this suggests that our
previously shown dissociation between comprehension
(as manipulated by context) and eye movements is a true
null effect rather than being due to a weak manipulation
of comprehension or poor measures of the cognitive ef-
fects on eye movements. This is something that will
need further testing, as the likelihood that it is a true
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null effect can only be ascertained through a program-
matic approach of attempts to reject the null, such as
the current study. Importantly, these results also suggest
that the online control of eye movements in dynamic
scenes is highly task dependent.
General discussion
Why does viewing and understanding films seem so
easy? Some have argued that this happens because film-
makers have mastered the craft and over the past cen-
tury have developed a set of practices that direct
attention (Smith, 2012) and comprehension (Magliano,
Dijkstra, & Zwaan, 1996; Magliano, Miller, & Zwaan,
2001; Magliano & Zacks, 2011). Filmmakers have docu-
mented this notion of control over how viewers process
film (Lumet, 1995; Murch, 2001). However, until re-
cently few studies have explored how these techniques
guide the attentional processes that affect the earliest
stages of comprehension (Loschky et al., 2015). The re-
sults of the present study are largely consistent with those
of Loschky et al. (2015) and support the Tyranny of Film
hypothesis. The intuitions that cinema conventions guide
the eye, and in turn comprehension, are born out in the
present study. Moreover, we extend insights gained from
Loschky et al. (2015), who focused on a clip from a James
Bond movie, Moonraker, that used intensive continuity
editing practices (Bordwell, 2002). It makes sense that
there is strong attentional synchrony in such a film be-
cause the length of the shots and the dynamic movement
do not afford top-down driven exploration (Smith, 2012).
Fig. 7 Top: Proportion of participants fixating the car throughout the film clip (Comprehension group [blue], Map task group [red]). The higher the
value, the more participants looked at the car. The car first appears in the clip at frame 541, which is in time bin 570. Bottom: Film stills show the
region of interest for the frame, with fixation and heat maps superimposed. The stills indicate when both groups fixated the car at a similar rate
(a) and when the car first reappears and was highly fixated by the Comprehension group, but not the Map task group, who looked at the
storefronts (b)
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Interestingly, a long continuous shot, such as that used in
the present study, potentially does allow endogenous ex-
ploration, especially in the context of a situationally rich
environment, as in the scene from Touch of Evil. Nonethe-
less, our results showed a remaining Tyranny of Film that
was likely produced by the filmmaker’s mis-en-scene (i.e.,
staging), framing of the shot, and movement of the camera
in the scene, drawing viewers’ eyes where the filmmaker
likely intended.
Rethinking the tyranny of film
One potential reason for the overall null effect of com-
prehension on eye movements with Touch of Evil
(Welles & Zugsmith, 1958) could be that even though it
was chosen for what appeared to be weak bottom-up
features, it still guided participant eye movements as
much as the Moonraker (Broccoli & Gilbert, 1979) film
clip used in the previous study (Loschky et al., 2015).
However, Fig. 8a, b clearly show Moonraker produced
Fig. 8 a The average sum weighted gaze covariance for all eye-tracking conditions in the James Bond film Moonraker (Loschky et al., 2015) and
Touch of Evil studies. The purple bars are for the Moonraker study, the blue bars are for the Touch of Evil comprehension conditions, and the red
bar is for the Touch of Evil map task. b The average number of gaze clusters for the same experiments. JBMR_CON, James Bond Moonraker Context
condition; JBMR_NC, James Bond Moonraker No-context condition; ToE1_CON, Touch of Evil experiment 1 Context condition; ToE1_NC, Touch of Evil
experiment 1 No-context condition; ToE2_CON_INF, Touch of Evil experiment 2 Context + Inference; ToE2_CON_Ninf, Touch of Evil experiment 2 Context
+ No-inference; ToE2_NC, Touch of Evil experiment 2 No-context; ToE2_MAP, Touch of Evil map task
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more clustering (i.e., lower sum of weight gaze covari-
ance) on fewer clusters than Touch of Evil. The covari-
ance measure presented below is the sum of the
covariances of the optimal number of clusters used to
describe the distribution of the gaze during each frame.
The “weighted” component of the measures indicates
that the covariance measure gives more weight to clus-
ters that are composed of more gaze points (see Mital et
al., 2010 for more details). This is essentially the amount
of spread in gaze for each frame, while controlling for
the number of clusters of gaze and how many partici-
pants are in each cluster. Furthermore, as would be ex-
pected based on the gaze similarity results, the map task
had even less clustering than all other conditions.5 Thus,
it seems that even films with relatively weak bottom-up
features show little effect of comprehension on eye
movements. Touch of Evil does have relatively weak
bottom-up features when compared to Moonraker, yet
the comprehension and eye-movement results are
analogous.
The results in Fig. 8 call for a reconsideration of the
Tyranny of Film hypothesis, which states that there is no
opportunity for differences in comprehension to be
expressed through differences in eye movements due to
bottom-up guidance of viewer attention by visual fea-
tures. Clearly, fewer people are looking at the same
places at the same times in Touch of Evil than in Moon-
raker, yet we still find few effects of the large differences
in comprehension (as manipulated by context) on eye
movements.
The results in Fig. 8 also allow us to more fully con-
sider the gaze similarity differences between the Com-
prehension and Map task groups shown in Fig. 6. Those
results showed that, as predicted, the Map task group
had reduced gaze similarity compared to the Compre-
hension group. However, the gaze similarity metric by it-
self cannot tell us if that reduced gaze similarity was due
to an overall reduction in attentional synchrony for the
Map task group, or to equal attentional synchrony but at
a different screen location(s) than the Comprehension
group. In fact, as noted above, Fig. 8 indicates that the
Map task group indeed had reduced attentional syn-
chrony (i.e., more sum-weighted gaze covariance, and
fewer gaze clusters). Finally, Fig. 7 showed that the Map
task group specifically looked less at the car than the
Comprehension group, which may account, at least in
part, for the reductions in attentional synchrony (Fig. 8),
and gaze similarity (Fig. 6).
Top-down attention takes time in film
One possible reason for the modest relationship be-
tween film comprehension and eye movements during
film viewing is that there is often a delay in top-down
effects when the scene is not known before onset
(Carmi & Itti, 2006; Smith & Mital, 2013). The Touch
of Evil clip was chosen in part because it doesn’t intro-
duce a new shot every 2–3 seconds, but it may be that
the introduction of new information due to the camera
continuously tracking in the shot creates a similar ef-
fect of keeping the viewer in an early stage of process-
ing that relies more on bottom-up processing. While it
is now well known that, when viewing static scene im-
ages, there are immediate top-down effects on eye
movements (e.g., the first saccade in a visual search
task; Eckstein et al., 2006; Ehinger, Hidalgo-Sotelo, Tor-
ralba, & Oliva, 2009; Torralba et al., 2006), the same
has not been found when viewing dynamic scenes,
namely film and video. Instead, when viewing video
with no prior knowledge of its content, top-down ef-
fects on attention have been found to have a delayed
onset of 2–3 seconds, which has largely been explained
as being due to the overwhelming attentional capture
by motion during that early time period (Carmi & Itti,
2006; Smith & Mital, 2013). Further work is needed to test
the differences between task-specific and comprehension-
based differences in top-down effects on visual attention
when viewing film and video.
The notion that top down effects may take time is con-
sistent with research on establishing coherence in dis-
course comprehension at the local level (i.e., how the
current narrative constituent fits in with the immediate
context) versus the global level (i.e., how the current nar-
rative constituent fits in with the larger story context).
There was considerable debate as to whether readers
need to establish global coherence (a top-down process)
in light of evidence of local coherence (Graesser, Singer,
& Trabasso, 1994; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992). However,
that debate has largely been resolved and there is
strong evidence that readers routinely establish both
local and global coherence (e.g., O’brien & Albrecht,
1992). In the context of reading narratives, global co-
herence can be supported by memory-based activation
(McKoon & Ratcliff, 1998; Myers & O’Brien, 1998).
Upon reading a sentence, semantically aligned content
from the mental model is passively activated, which can
then be used to establish global coherence. Importantly,
the output of those processes can take time and be com-
pleted while reading subsequent sentences (O’Brien &
Cook, 2016). However, in the case of the present study, if
one does not have propositions reflecting knowledge of
the bomb being associated with the car stored in the men-
tal model for the scene, then obviously that knowledge
cannot serve as a basis for establishing global coherence
when the car re-appears in the street.
When comprehension has an effect
Overall, our study found few effects of comprehension
on eye movements during film viewing. However, we
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found the agent effect in experiment 2a, and modest ef-
fects of the event model were also found in Loschky et
al. (2015). Thus, film comprehension at the local level
(i.e., current event model construction) can have an im-
pact on visual attention during film viewing. Interest-
ingly, the effects found may have occurred through
different mechanisms. The agent effect found in the
current study appears to have occurred because partici-
pants in the No-context condition continued to track
the agents (the walking couple) in their event model,
which may have been a more automated process (Find-
lay & Walker, 1999). Conversely, the effect in Loschky et
al. (2015) appears to have occurred due to the No-
context group needing to use effortful processing to up-
date their event model with what was presented. Based
on this, differences in eye movements may be indicative
of the amount of effortful processing the viewer used to
comprehend a scene. The map task similarly required ef-
fortful searching and mental map updating to success-
fully complete the task. The importance of the potential
need for effortful processing is that it may indicate the
relative difficulty of updating the various event indices of
an event model during narrative comprehension (Zwaan,
Langston, & Graesser, 1995). In the current study, we
only manipulated two of the five indices of the event
indexing model (agent and causality). A more compre-
hensive study manipulating all five indices (agent, time,
place, causality, and intentionality [goal-relevance]) may
give a clearer picture of the effect of each of these event
indices on attention. We hypothesize that when an event
index must be effortfully updated to maintain compre-
hension for a narrative, it will predictably guide eye
movements.
What breaks the Tyranny of Film?
Despite the ambiguity of what drives the Tyranny of
Film, the relative dissociation between eye movements
and narrative comprehension is very surprising in Touch
of Evil, especially given the strength and consistency of
the differences in comprehension between the groups.
These findings are inconsistent with the majority of pre-
vious work looking at top-down task-based effects on
scene viewing (Foulsham & Underwood, 2007; Hender-
son et al., 2007; Henderson et al., 2013; Smith & Mital,
2013; Yarbus, 1967).
One characteristic of this finding is that it is inconsist-
ent with a strict interpretation of the eye–mind hypoth-
esis (Just & Carpenter, 1980; Reichle et al., 1998; Reilly
& Radach, 2006). It appears that the event index of caus-
ality, in relation to the bomb, in participants’ event
models is not guiding eye movements, while agency is
having a modest effect. One way of explaining these re-
sults is in terms of the above-mentioned local and global
levels of coherence. Perhaps the process of identifying
and locating key agents in the narrative, and attending
to them, is an important local coherence maintenance
process, as suggested by the agent effect found in expe-
riment 2a. Agent tracking may operate at a lower level
than the maintenance and calculation of causal rela-
tionships (e.g., potential consequences of the bomb),
which may be considered more of a global coherence
maintenance process. According to this idea, during film
viewing, local processing of the narrative may strongly
guide eye movements, while global processing of the
narrative may have a weaker effect. This would not ne-
cessarily suggest that global processing of causal event
indices cannot affect eye movements. It is possible that,
for example, because the bomb was hidden in the trunk
of the car, a look at its hiding place provided no new in-
formation.6 Nevertheless, this interpretation of the re-
sults would argue for a weaker version of the eye–mind
hypothesis. Namely, depending on viewers’ level of co-
herence processing (i.e., local vs. global) there may be
stronger or weaker associations between eye move-
ments and thought (Lamont, Henderson, & Smith,
2010; Smith, 2015).
This weak version of the eye–mind hypothesis may be
due in part to film viewing being driven by both bottom-
up features (Mital et al., 2010) and mandatory top-down
processes (Baluch & Itti, 2011). Mandatory top-down
processes are well-learned, more automated processes, as
opposed to volitional top-down processes. A classic
mandatory process is the hollow face illusion, when a con-
cave face (e.g., the inside of a mask), is perceived as convex
(Baluch & Itti, 2011; Gregory, 1970). Another example is
following the speaker of a conversation (Birmingham et
al., 2008; Coutrot & Guyader, 2014; Ho et al., 2015; Vo et
al., 2012). Within film viewing, the task of comprehension
may have certain mandatory processes used to construct
an event model, such as agent tracking. According to this
idea, causality maintenance and calculation may be less
automatic than agent tracking, and may require more vol-
itional top-down attentional control.
One recent theory that is consonant with the above
hypotheses is the role of the default mode network in
narrative comprehension (Tylén et al., 2015). That is,
the default mode network may allow for the accumula-
tion of coherent plot information. Conversely, when plot
information is less coherent, the frontoparietal control
network is thought to allow for a more effortful search
for narrative coherence through a more top-down de-
ployment of attention. The reason for this is that the de-
fault mode network has been shown to be less active
when visual attention is effortfully deployed (Andrews-
Hanna, Reidler, Huang, & Buckner, 2010; Andrews-
Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner, 2010). One
might expect that the default mode network should not
play a large role in processing the highly complex visual
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stimulus of a film, but fMRI research on film viewing
has found that it activates the default mode network
(Hasson et al., 2008; Hasson, Malach, & Heeger, 2010).
Additionally, areas thought to make up part of the de-
fault mode network have been shown to be similarly ac-
tivated during both film viewing and audio book
listening (Hasson et al., 2008; Yeshurun et al., 2017).
Based on the above, while watching a movie, breaking
the Tyranny of Film may have two potential paths. The
first could be to directly tap into a mandatory process
(e.g., agent tracking) that may be necessary for maintain-
ing local coherence. If the narrative one viewer perceives
in a scene has entirely different characters than the nar-
rative another perceives in the same scene, they should
track different agents. We tested this hypothesis in the
current study, but the film clip used appears to have
been well constructed by the filmmakers to give high
importance to both the walking couple and the couple
in the car; thus, the observed agent effect was short-
lived. The other track to breaking the Tyranny of Film is
to move away from mandatory processing and auto-
mated comprehension processes. The map task appears
to have done this, but it should be possible with a com-
prehension manipulation as well. For example, in
Loschky et al. (2015), the effect on eye movements oc-
curred during a complex cross-cutting sequence that re-
quired viewers to make an inference (that both
sequences would come together in time and space and
solve the life-and-death problem faced by the protagon-
ist in one of the two sequences). The viewers that had
more trouble making the inference about a critical shot
showed eye-movement differences during that shot.
However, this shot was essentially a static scene, and
thus lacked important motion features to guide viewer
attention. Thus, future work should test if a break in co-
herence allows viewers to move from mandatory pro-
cessing to more effortful, volitional processing even
during dynamic scenes in a film.
Implications for theory and practice
The opening scene of Touch of Evil was chosen in part
because it is one of the mostly widely discussed exam-
ples of a long-take in film history. It is theorized to illus-
trate how the craft of filmmaking can guide attention
and affective response (D’Angelo, 2012), but to also
allow for differences between the viewers (Bazin, 1967,
p. 35–36). As such, it was an ideal clip for testing the
role that the viewer’s active film comprehension pro-
cesses play in driving their attention.
The results of this study speak to the long-standing
debate in film theory regarding the nature of meaning
and how it is derived. Classic perspectives on film as-
sume that the structure of film plays a central role in
how films are understood (Eisenstein, 1948; Pudovkin,
1970). The Spielberg (2013) quote at the outset of this
paper illustrates this perspective. On the other hand,
constructivist perspectives of film response assume that
meaning is (almost) entirely derived by the viewer, and
there is no inherent connection to content (Hall, 1980),
a view voiced by Tarantino in the second quote at the
beginning of this paper. Similar debates exist in a variety
of areas of cognitive science, such as regarding top-down
and bottom-up contributions to perception (Firestone &
Scholl, 2016) and to comprehension (Graesser et al., 1994).
Overall, the present results are consistent with a grow-
ing view in film theory that the structure of a film mat-
ters for meaning making (Anderson, 1998). We have
learned from experiments 1 and 2a that despite large dif-
ferences in global understanding of a film, the visual fea-
tures of film will guide the attention of different viewers
to the same things at the same times. We assume that
what viewers attend to will have an impact on what
knowledge is activated moment-to-moment as a film is
processed. Experiment 2b provided evidence consistent
with this by showing that participants in the comprehen-
sion task overtly attended to more narrative-relevant
content (e.g., the car) than those in the map task, and
subsequently showed better comprehension of the narra-
tive (as indicated by a much higher probability of ma-
king a bomb-relevant inference). Knowledge activation
provides the basis for mental model construction
(Kintsch, 1988, 1998; Myers & O’Brien, 1998). If viewers
have the goal to understand and be entertained by a
film, their mental models will likely be closely con-
strained by that activated knowledge (Graesser et al.,
1994). Such results are consistent with the central role
of the film in guiding viewers’ attention and understand-
ing of it (Bordwell & Thompson, 2001; Katz, 1991;
Murch, 2001). However, if viewers have an idiosyncratic
goal when watching a film, the constructive processes
that support that activity could lead to a mental model
that reflects ideas beyond the events conveyed in the
film. The results for the map task are consistent with
this assertion, since viewers who did well in the task
came away after watching the clip with a non-normative
representation of it (centered on its spatial layout, rather
than its suspense-inducing narrative). Such results are
consistent with the constructivist perspective (Bordwell
& Carroll, 1996; Hall, 1980; Tseng & Bateman, 2013).
Some considerations regarding the nature of the present
study
The scene from Touch of Evil was chosen for this study
for very specific reasons. It is one of the most well dis-
cussed and described scenes of its era precisely because
it is seen as a textbook example of how cinematic tech-
niques can affect how films are processed (Bazin, 1967).
Specifically, it is considered a virtuoso example of
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creating and maintaining a high level of suspense
throughout a three-minute opening of a film (D’Angelo,
2012). This allowed us to manipulate the presence or ab-
sence of that suspense (i.e., a vivid example of film com-
prehension). In addition, the clip is equally famous for
having a single three-minute shot with no cuts, ex-
tremely rare in film history (Bazin, 1967), thus allowing
us to test our previous proposal (Loschky et al., 2015)
that the weak effects of comprehension on eye move-
ments while watching a film clip was due to using as
series of short (~ 2 s) shots.
However, we must acknowledge the fact that the con-
clusions based on this study are grounded in using one
film clip. While this limits the generalizability of our re-
sults to some extent, the results are both consistent with
and build upon those of Loschky et al. (2015), which
used a very different film clip. Furthermore, there are
numerous widely cited studies that pioneered entirely
new areas of research that used a single complex natur-
alistic stimulus (Hasson, Nir, Levy, Fuhrmann, &
Malach, 2004; Yarbus, 1967), a single real-world inter-
action (Simons & Levin, 1998), or, when studying high
level comprehension, of a single narrative (Anderson &
Pichert, 1978; Bransford & Johnson, 1972). There are
good reasons for this. When using such complex natur-
alistic stimuli as found materials, they often differ on a
variety of dimensions beyond those that are the target of
any given study, and those differences can introduce
confounds that can make using multiple, naturally oc-
curring items untenable given the goals of the study.
Our current study, and those cited above, are prime ex-
amples of this point. Of course, a program of research
cannot rest on a series of studies based on single items.
Nevertheless, we see such studies as playing a valuable
role in the seminal stages of a program of research be-
cause they can guide the generation of critical hypoth-
eses to be tested with more controlled and generalizable
studies. As such, as the study of film processing matures,
it is likely that more naturalistic materials (e.g., clips
from existing films) will have to give way to more con-
trolled, experimenter-generated materials with numer-
ous versions sharing features of interest (for a similar
argument, see Magliano & Graesser, 1991).
Conclusions
The current study tested whether a person’s comprehen-
sion during film viewing affects their attention, as mea-
sured by their eye movements. The differences in
comprehension we found were similar to those com-
monly found in studies of reading comprehension, but
rarely studied with film. However, despite these large
comprehension differences, similar to our previous study
that used a very different film clip (Loschky et al., 2015),
we found only modest and targeted differences in eye
movements. These findings are counterintuitive based
on work looking at top-down effects on eye movements
in static scenes (Yarbus, 1967), but consistent with the
finding of strong attentional synchrony in film viewing
(Dorr et al., 2010; Mital et al., 2010; Smith & Mital,
2013; Wang et al., 2012). Based on these results, the Tyr-
anny of Film hypothesis was mostly supported. This sug-
gests that the processes by which information is
extracted through eye movements may differ between
film narratives and reading (Magliano et al., 2013), as
seen in the general dissociation between eye movements
and comprehension in our study. The results are inter-
esting in terms of both film comprehension processes
and eye-movement processes in film perception, but the
dissociation of these processes may be of most interest.
During film viewing, people can look at the same places
at the same times but have different understandings of
the narrative. These results seem to support both the
views expressed by Spielberg and Tarantino in the
quotes at the beginning of this paper. This is a counter-
example to the common assumption in many eye-
movement studies that there is a strong association be-
tween eye movements and thought (Just & Carpenter,
1980; Reichle et al., 1998; Reilly & Radach, 2006). Never-
theless, we did find an effect on eye movements of a ma-
nipulation of local coherence (the agent effect) that was
stronger than our manipulation of global coherence (the
causal consequences of the bomb). Further studies
should investigate whether such local versus global co-
herence manipulations differentially affect eye move-
ments during film viewing. Furthermore, the results
from the Map task condition in experiment 2b indicate
that tasks at odds with film narrative comprehension
can provide evidence for cognitive control of eye move-
ments, supporting the eye–mind hypothesis. To better
understand these relationships between eye movements
and comprehension during film viewing, further studies
need to combine theories and methods from the fields
of scene perception, event perception, and narrative
comprehension (Loschky, Hutson, Magliano, Larson, &
Smith, 2016; Loschky, Hutson, Magliano, Larson, &
Smith, 2014; Magliano, Larson, Higgs, & Loschky, 2016).
Importantly, this research drew on the craft knowledge
of the filmmakers of the clip used and theory about the
clip and film more generally. As such, the current study
can inform the theory and practice of filmmaking. We
started the paper with two contrasting quotes from
prominent filmmakers. Our results provided more evi-
dence consistent with Spielberg’s perspective, in that our
participants mostly knew “…where to look at the exact
same time” (Spielberg, 2013). However, as we have dis-
cussed, demonstrating control over gaze during film
viewing does not guarantee control over comprehension
and affective response. In fact, our research shows that
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there can be a disconnect between them. In addition, we
show evidence of film viewers’ ability to intentionally
take an idiosyncratic approach to attending to and un-
derstanding the film clip, showing that different viewers
can, with effort, see a movie very differently than
intended, consistent with Tarantino’s perspective. Thus,
our research shows how both Spielberg and Tarantino
can be correct, under different viewing conditions, even
though on the surface their quotes appear contradictory.
Further research will be needed to test and refine these
hypotheses.
Endnotes
1These errors values are based on the calibration pro-
cedure, and the technical specifications for the Eye-
Link1000 from SR Research. Our video clips were
shorter in duration than the tests done by SR Research
to produce those specifications, and would not be ex-
pected to require recalibration.
2Additional support for comprehension differences
were found through event segmentation (Loschky et al.,
2016; Loschky et al., 2014; Magliano et al., 2016) results
(Zacks & Tversky, 2001). The event segmentation results
indicate online differences in segmentation, with viewers
in the No-context condition identifying more event
boundaries and boundaries at different locations than
those in the Context condition.
3This dialogue was, at most, a minor problem for ex-
periment 1. First, the mention is not specifically of the
bomb, but rather of a “ticking noise”. This presumably is
what allowed exactly one participant out of 42 (i.e., 2%)
in the No-context condition in experiment 1 to make an
inference about a bomb, but the vast majority, 41 of 42
(98%) in experiment 1 did not. The one thing it most
likely did was remind Context condition participants
about the bomb, which would explain the higher infer-
ence rate for that condition in experiment 1 over 2. Sec-
ond, the mention of the bomb occurs with only 15 s left
in the clip, so even if it did remind Context condition
participants of the bomb, this would not have an effect
for the first 2 minutes and 39 seconds of shared viewing
time in experiment 1.
4Numerous Touch of Evil fan websites discuss the film-
ing location of this classic film, and particularly the fam-
ous opening scene filmed in Venice Beach, California.
Based on one such site (Loschky et al., 2014), and our
own judgment comparing the film with current and
archival photos of the area, we chose the streets on Goo-
gle Maps to use. The shot starts at a lot near the corner
of Windward Ave. and Speedway. From there the shot
goes south west on Woodward Ave. to what is now
Ocean Front Walk. From there the shot goes north west
on Ocean Front Walk.
5The lack of a difference in the number of clusters for
the map task and the other Touch of Evil conditions
makes sense, because as the overall clustering lessens,
there are going to be fewer groupings of gaze that are
identified as a cluster.
6Of course, since about half of the viewers who knew
about the bomb did not make a predictive inference
about it at the end of the clip, this suggests that they
were unable to hold it in their working memory till the
end of the clip (and data to test this hypothesis support
it, as shown in Hutson et al. (Robh, 2011)). Yet, those
participants (Context + No-inference) were just as likely
to look at the car as those who did not forget the bomb
(Context + Inference), or those who never knew about
the bomb (No-context + No-inference).
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